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The structures that regulate and support the Australian judiciary reflect and serve the 
traditional judicial values of independence, impartiality and the rule of law. Yet modern 
society places emphasis on an additional range of values that are expected of 
government and public institutions. These contemporary values include diversity, 
transparency, accountability and efficiency. Reforms to introduce regulatory and 
support structures that prioritise and facilitate these values in the judicial arm has 
proved challenging, sometimes contentious. This article reports on a survey of 
Australian judicial officers (n=142) from across different jurisdictions. Participants 
were asked what they considered to be the most pressing challenges that face the 
various levels of the Australian judiciary, and whether the current regulatory and 
support environment achieves international best practice. The responses provide a 
nuanced picture of the state of the modern Australian judiciary as it appears to those 
within it. The study facilitates an understanding of the degree to which judicial officers 
are satisfied with the current legal and regulatory framework, and, where they are 
dissatisfied, the nature of their disquiet. While not seeking to offer complete resolutions 
to the many issues canvassed, the data and analysis presented in this article serve as 
an interruption to regulatory and academic studies of the Australia judiciary, with the 
potential to illuminate and re-orientate the reform conversation in light of the judicial 
perspective on these various issues. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judges are more open to public scrutiny than ever before. Their work is generally 
conducted in open court, sometimes with proceedings broadcast or digitally streamed. 
Their decisions, conduct and attitudes are widely reported and critiqued. In the words 
of Professor John Williams, ‘exponential commentary and criticism is the new reality’.1 
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1  John M Williams, “Of ‘Fragile Bastions’, ‘Political Judges’ and ‘Robust Debates’: Judges and Their 
Critics” in Rebecca Ananian-Welsh and Jonathan Crowe (eds) Judicial Independence: 
Contemporary Challenges, Future Directions (Federation Press, 2016) 210. 
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In the United States, websites rank and comment on judicial performance.2 Similarly, 
in New Zealand a ranking of judges claims to be ‘the “go to” resource for lawyers and 
the broader public’.3 Some courts have adopted a proactive approach, hiring media 
officers to assist in the communication of their work, occasionally making public 
comment and permitting media interviews with judicial officers.4 A few judges and 
courts have taken the plunge into social media.5 Researchers are also gaining increasing 
access to judicial officers, in efforts to learn more about the judicial role.6 The Judicial 
Conference of Australia, a professional association for judicial officers, has taken on 
the role of defending the judiciary from comment that is perceived to be inaccurate or 
unfair, or responding to proposals for reform.7  In some jurisdictions, judges have 
appeared and given evidence before parliamentary committees. 8  Yet, despite this 
increased activity in the public realm, there is much about the judicial experience of 
judging and the court system that is not well understood.  
Judicial officers rarely speak candidly about being a judge or about the strengths and 
shortcomings of the judicial system.9 Instead, on the occasions that those in senior 
positions in the judiciary do give speeches or interviews, they tend to offer reflections 
upon matters of high principle, frequently from the vantage point of legal history. Yet, 
the experiences and views of judges on the judicial system, and judicial support and 
regulation are matters of real moment: understanding how judicial officers experience 
                                                        
2  See http://www.therobingroom.com/md/Default.aspx?state=MD (03012018), a website that 
describes itself as ‘where judges are judged’. 
3 See http://www.kiwisfirst.com/2014-new-zealand-judge-survey-results/ (10052017). Judges are 
reportedly ranked by intelligence, fairness, legal knowledge and personal character. 
4  For discussion of early developments in this vein, see, Elizabeth Handsley, ‘Can Public Sector 
Approaches to Accountability Be Applied to the Judiciary?’ (2001) 18 Law in Context 62, 94–5. 
5  For example, in 2013, it was reported that the Supreme Court of Victoria would refashion its 
website as a ‘multi-media hub with video on demand, summaries of judgments and capacity for the 
community to leave comments on news from the court’, including what the Chief Justice said was 
a ‘plan that a retired judge might write a regular blog for the court website to create greater 
community understanding around controversial issues’: Chris Merritt, ‘Retired judge to blog for 
Supreme Court’, The Australian (22 October 2013). While that blog no longer appears on the 
Court’s website, at least one judicial member of that Court tweets (Justice Lex Lasry, as @Lasry08). 
See generally, Alysia Blackham and George Williams, ‘Social Media and Court Communication’ 
[2015] Public Law 403; Alysia Blackham and George Williams, ‘Social Media and the Judiciary: 
A Challenge to Judicial Independence?’ in Rebecca Ananian-Welsh and Jonathan Crowe (eds) 
Judicial Independence: Contemporary Challenges, Future Directions (Federation Press, 2016) 223. 
6  See, eg, Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu ‘The National Survey of Australian Judges: An 
overview of findings’ (2008) 18 Journal of Judicial Administration 5; Heather Douglas, ‘Practice 
and Persuasion: Women, Feminism and Judicial Diversity’ in Rebecca Ananian-Welsh and 
Jonathan Crowe (eds) Judicial Independence: Contemporary Challenges, Future Directions 
(Federation Press, 2016) 76. 
7  See, eg., <http://www.jca.asn.au/inaccurate-reporting-of-judges-sentencing-reasons-30-november-
2017/> (04012018). 
8  See, e.g., <https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/justice-committee/news-parliament-20151/courts-tribunals-fees-charges-fourth-evidence-
15-16> (24042018). 
9  For two notable exceptions, see Michael Kirby, ‘What is it Really Like to be a Justice of the High 
Court of Australia?’ (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 514 and Susan Kiefel, ‘On Being a Judge’ 
(Speech delivered at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 15 January 2013). 
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challenges in their role can assist in crafting appropriate reform as well as indicating 
where greater research and regulatory efforts are most desirable. 
Academic and regulatory debates in Australia over judicial reform are presently 
insufficiently tested against judicial experience and perspective. To date, judicial 
perspectives are predominantly gained through the public statements of current or 
former judges, confidential consultations between the government and the heads of 
jurisdiction, or limited empirical work. In this latter respect, the most important work 
is that undertaken by Professors Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack, who have 
conducted extensive empirical research on the Australian judiciary, including two 
magistrate experience surveys (2002 and 2007) and a judicial experience survey 
(2007).10 
This article reports on quantitative and qualitative survey research carried out by the 
authors, which follows in the path forged by Roach Anleu and Mack in the Australian 
judicial sphere but seeks to complement it in two key ways. The first is by shifting the 
focus of the empirical questions to regulatory challenges, and the second, by seeking to 
understand the judicial perspective a decade after Roach Anleu and Mack undertook 
their multi-jurisdictional survey,11 and in the wake of some significant developments 
affecting the judiciary.12 These include the controversy that attended the appointment 
of Chief Justice Tim Carmody in Queensland,13 experimentation with reform of the 
process for making appointments to the federal judiciary,14 and the adoption of judicial 
complaints mechanisms in a number of jurisdictions.15 All these, as well as other less 
discernible influences, such as technological innovation or familiarity with 
developments in comparable foreign jurisdictions, may plausibly have affected the way 
Australian judicial officers understand and experience their role. 
                                                        
10  Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack, Performing Judicial Authority in the Lower Courts 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2017); Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack, ‘Managing Work and Family 
in the Judiciary: Metaphors and Strategies’ (2016) 18(2) Flinders Law Journal 213; Sharyn Roach 
Anleu and Kathy Mack, ‘Judicial Performance and Experiences of Judicial Work: Findings from 
Socio-Legal Research’ (2014) 4(5) Onati Socio-Legal Series 1015; Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy 
Mack, ‘Work Allocation in Australian Courts: Court Staff and the Judiciary’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law 
Review 669; Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack, ‘Job Satisfaction in the Judiciary’ (2013) 28(5) 
Work, Employment and Society 683; Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, ‘In-Court Judicial 
Behaviours, Gender and Legitimacy’ (2012) 21 Griffith Law Review 728; Mack and Roach Anleu, 
‘The National Survey of Australian Judges’, above n 6; Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, ‘The 
Security of Tenure of Australian Magistrates’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 370. 
11  Mack and Roach Anleu ‘The National Survey of Australian Judges’, above n 6. 
12  This is not just an Australian concern. The Judicial Attitudes Survey conducted in England and 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland provides a remarkable snapshot of the judiciary from the 
inside. Conducted for the first time in 2014, the survey is now providing longitudinal data about 
judicial working conditions. 
13  Rebecca Ananian-Welsh, Gabrielle Appleby and Andrew Lynch, The Tim Carmody Affair - 
Australia’s Greatest Judicial Crisis (NewSouth Publishing, 2016). 
14  Elizabeth Handsley and Andrew Lynch, ‘Facing up to Diversity? Transparency and the Reform of 
Commonwealth Judicial Appointments 2008-13’ (2015) 37 Sydney Law Review 187. 
15  See Gabrielle Appleby and Suzanne Le Mire, ‘Judicial Conduct: Crafting a System That Enhances 
Institutional Integrity’ (2014) 38 Melbourne University Law Review 1. 
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Our intention in this article is to use the data to disrupt the current scholarly and 
regulatory debate in relation to key aspects of judicial support and regulation. In doing 
so, we will explore how this data calls for a reorientation of these debates, or where it 
demonstrates the need for further research to be undertaken. We do not purport to 
proffer full and concrete solutions to the regulatory challenges that we consider; rather 
we highlight the need for reassessment, further study and research. 
The article opens in Part II with a description of the methodology employed in the 
survey, and offers some general comments about its efficacy and limitations. Part III 
outlines in brief the demographics of the survey participants. The article then moves on 
to consider the substantive data organised into three broad themes: appointment 
(Part IV); the working life of the judge (Part V); and complaints, discipline, tenure and 
removal (Part VI). In each area some contextual background is provided before the data 
are presented; and a thematic discussion and analysis then follows. Part VII concludes 
by highlighting the key themes that emerge from the data and suggesting some further 
research directions signaled by the empirical disruption offered by the data. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
In 2016 we conducted a survey to investigate the views of Australian judges across 
different federal, State and Territory jurisdictions regarding the regulatory and working 
challenges they face. The survey, in which a total of 142 judicial officers participated, 
was conducted on the following bases: 
 completion of the survey was voluntary; 
 all data were collected anonymously and, while a small amount of demographic 
information was requested to assist with analysis, this portion of the survey was 
optional; 
 the survey was administered online, although a Word version was available on 
request which participants could complete and return by post or email; 
 the research team sought the approval of Heads of Jurisdiction16 to survey the 
judicial officers of their court and the survey was not distributed to the judicial 
officers of any court where prior approval had not been obtained; and 
 at the conclusion of the project, Heads of Jurisdiction who granted approval for 
the judicial officers of their court to participate were provided with a short 
                                                        
16  Heads of Jurisdiction approached were: Federal Court of Australia, the Family Court of Australia, 
the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, the Supreme Courts of all six States and the Northern 
Territory, the District Courts of New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Western 
Australia, the County Court of Victoria, the Local Courts of New South Wales and the Northern 
Territory, and the Magistrates Court of Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Western 
Australia. 
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summary of the results, which could be distributed to judges in their court at the 
Head of Jurisdiction’s discretion. 
The questions corresponded with the lifecycle of judges by looking at appointment 
issues, challenges throughout the working life of a judge (such as education, ethical 
support, workload, remuneration, and staffing and support), and matters relating to 
discipline and removal. The survey was divided into three sections. The first section 
(Part A) asked participants the extent to which they believed that thirteen listed 
challenges confront the judiciary in their jurisdiction. The second section (Parts B, C 
and D) took its design from a 2015 report of the United Kingdom’s Bingham Centre 
for the Rule of Law, The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges under 
Commonwealth Principles: A Compendium and Analysis of Best Practice.17 That report 
details ‘best practice’ in the areas of judicial appointment, tenure, discipline and 
removal across all Commonwealth countries, including the Australian federal, state and 
territory court systems. In the second section of the survey, participants were asked the 
extent to which they agreed that the current arrangements in their jurisdiction satisfied 
the Bingham Report’s explanations of best practice. In this section of the survey, as in 
the first, each question presented the judicial officer with a Likert scale, from which the 
respondent could select a response (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly 
disagree), and participants were given an opportunity to explain or comment on their 
responses to each question.18 
The third section of the survey asked participants to provide specific demographic 
information. This included information about gender, length of judicial service, 
jurisdiction (NSW, Victoria, Tasmania, Western Australia, South Australia, 
Queensland, Northern Territory, or Federal), 19  and court level (Magistrates/Local; 
District/County/Federal Circuit; or Supreme/Federal/Family).20 In Parts IV–VI of this 
article, when quoting from the open responses of participants, we generally stipulate 
these demographic data to provide the context of the comment. However, this 
information is omitted where there is a real risk that it would identify the respondent. 
                                                        
17  Jan van Zyl Smit, The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges under Commonwealth 
Principles: A Compendium and Analysis of Best Practice (Report of Research Undertaken by 
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law) (The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
2015) 
18  A number of these comments are reproduced in this paper. Where necessary they have been lightly 
edited to remove any typographical errors. 
19  The only jurisdiction not included in the survey was the Australian Capital Territory. When the 
survey was administered in March 2016, there were just 11 judicial officers serving in that 
jurisdiction. It was felt by the research team that members of a group with such low numbers might 
have legitimate concerns about the extent to which their anonymity could be preserved upon 
publication of the data. The two jurisdictions with the lowest numbers of judicial officers included 
in the survey had almost double the number of the Australian Capital Territory – these being 
Tasmania and the Northern Territory with 19 and 20 judicial officers respectively. 
20  The High Court of Australia was not included in the survey. This was for a similar reason to that 
which justified the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Australian Capital Territory – recognition 
that concerns as to the preservation of anonymity were legitimate in a setting with so few judicial 
officers and were likely to inhibit responses.  
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In some courts, the Head of Jurisdiction granted us permission to email each judicial 
officer individually (sometimes using a list of contact details provided by the Head of 
Jurisdiction) with a letter of invitation, information on the survey and an embedded link 
to the online survey. In other courts, the Head of Jurisdiction offered or agreed to 
distribute the survey internally on our behalf. Heads of Jurisdiction and individual 
judicial officers to whom the survey had previously been sent were contacted with a 
reminder and notice of when the online survey portal would close. Only three of 142 
respondents submitted their responses via a hardcopy of the survey, having requested a 
Word version. 
The only court that expressly declined to participate was the Federal Circuit Court of 
Australia, although no response to the request for approval to contact judicial officers 
was received from the Heads of Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Victoria, the 
District Court of South Australia, and the Magistrates Court of Queensland and Local 
Court of the Northern Territory. Our assumption that judicial officers in those courts 
were not sent the survey is supported by the demographic data collected. 
 
III. DEMOGRAPHIC SNAPSHOT 
The values of independence and impartiality have been a critical influence, and indeed 
an important constraint, upon the development of mechanisms for the regulation and 
accountability of the judicial arm of government. They are also of personal importance 
across the ranks of the judiciary, regardless of individual characteristics or the level and 
jurisdiction within which the judicial officer presides. However, those latter 
considerations may assume a more variable significance in respect of efforts to regulate 
the judiciary in order to promote other values, such as diversity or efficiency. 
Accordingly the survey administered by the authors sought some basic demographic 
data from participants in order to explore associations between those data and the 
responses provided. Participants were asked about their gender, length of service, 
jurisdiction and court level.  
Tests were conducted to determine whether there was a statistically significant 
relationship between pairs of discrete variables using the chi-squared test. These 
revealed a number of associations with gender. Female respondents were significantly 
more likely than males to provide responses indicating that quality of appointment, 
diversity, use of part-time judges and the adequacy of disciplinary and removal 
processes were challenges facing the judiciary. Court level also revealed some 
interesting associations. Respondents from superior and lower courts were significantly 
more likely than those from intermediate courts to flag workload as a challenge. Lower 
court judicial officers were also significantly more likely to see judicial pensions and 
remuneration as a challenge, and were less satisfied with the ethical support available 
to them.  
Although 142 individuals responded to the survey, some chose not to answer all 
questions (in the presentation of the data below, the number of responses for each 
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question is indicated). The demographic questions were answered by 130 respondents, 
of whom 58 per cent were men and 42 per cent were women. Given that women 
presently comprise only 35 per cent of the Australian judiciary, 21  this reflects a 
proportionately higher response from female judicial officers than male judicial 
officers. The profile of the respondents by length of judicial service, jurisdiction, and 
court level is broken down in Figures 1–3 below. When compared to the judiciary 
overall,22 these reveal that our respondents were more likely to be from superior and 
intermediate courts than would be expected of the general population of judicial 
officers. However, the jurisdictional affiliation of the respondents to the survey roughly 
conforms to the geographical spread of the Australian judiciary. 
Figure 1: Length of Judicial Service 
 
 
                                                        
21 Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, Judicial Gender Statistics 2017, available at: 
<https://aija.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/JudgesMagistrates.pdf> 
22  Brian Opeskin, ‘The State of the Judicature: A Statistical Profile of Australian Courts and Judges’ 
(2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 489. 
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Figure 2: Jurisdictional Affiliation23 
 
 
Figure 3: Level of Court Hierarchy 
 
 
                                                        
23 ACT is not included in this graph on the basis that it was not invited to participate in the survey. 
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IV. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT 
A. Context 
The process of judicial appointment in Australia has largely retained its traditional 
form. That is, it remains the gift of the executive, exercised with ‘unfettered 
discretion’24 by the relevant Attorney-General recommending judicial candidates to 
Cabinet, with appointment formally made by the Governor, the Governor-General or 
the Administrator of the jurisdiction. In several jurisdictions, changes have been 
introduced with the intention of enhancing process and transparency. For instance, in 
2008, the federal Attorney-General, Robert McClelland, introduced reforms to the 
process of appointment of judicial officers in the Federal Court of Australia, Family 
Court of Australia and the Federal Magistrates Court, since renamed the Federal Circuit 
Court This initiative included setting out criteria against which judicial candidates were 
to be evaluated, setting up a public process calling for expressions of interest and 
convening an advisory panel to assess candidates.25 The professed aim of these changes 
was to ‘seek to increase the diversity of the federal judiciary’ in relation to gender, 
residential location, professional background and experience, and cultural 
background.26  
Appointments to the High Court were exempt from these reforms, except for the 
Attorney-General’s stated intention to consult more broadly about potential candidates 
for that body than is required under s 5 of the High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth).27 
Although McClelland’s reforms operated for a number of years, they ‘slipped from the 
departmental website’ after the election of the conservative government in September 
2013,28 and no longer reflect federal practice. 
Reform has also been instigated at the State and Territory level, and while this has been 
varied, it has proven thus far to be more enduring in those jurisdictions where it has 
been undertaken.29  For example, in 2005 in Victoria, Attorney-General Rob Hulls 
indicated he was seeking to ‘secure both the best and the brightest and a judiciary that 
reflects the community it serves’.30 He introduced a broader consultation process, the 
                                                        
24  Handsley and Lynch, above 14. 
25  Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government, Judicial Appointments: Ensuring a 
Strong, Independent and Diverse Judiciary through a Transparent Process (April 2010). 
26  Ibid 1. 
27  Ibid 2-3. 
28  Handsley and Lynch, above n 14, 188. 
29  For a recent survey that includes all these jurisdictions see Judicial Conference of Australia, Judicial 
Appointments – A Comparative Study (April 2015). Since that report was produced, Queensland 
has introduced a protocol for judicial appointments in the wake of the Carmody affair, see: 
Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney-General, ‘Protocol for Judicial Appointments in 
Queensland’, accessed 24 October 2017 
<http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/472439/ja-pub-protocol-for-judicial-
appointments-in-queensland.pdf>. 
30  Rob Hulls, ‘We have thrown open the process for judicial appointment, previously subject to 
secrecy and whim’ (2005) 134 Victorian Bar News 11, 11. 
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identification and use of specific criteria and advertising for expressions of interest.31 
The system remains in place today, with potential candidates being able to apply on 
online for judicial office.32 
The changes described above have been publicly justified by a desire to enhance 
diversity. This responds to the relative homogeneity of the judiciary, especially in the 
superior courts across Australia. 33  Taking gender as one example of the various 
dimensions of diversity, as of 3 March 2017, the percentage of female judicial officers 
in Australian courts was 35 per cent.34 The highest percentage can be found in the 
Australian Capital Territory at 46 per cent; the highest percentage for a superior court 
is in the High Court at 43 per cent. However, the average percentage of women judges 
serving in other superior courts is 28 per cent. In some superior courts the percentage 
of women is markedly low. In the Western Australian Supreme Court women make up 
only 14 per cent of the bench, and in the NSW Supreme Court (including the Court of 
Appeal) the percentage of female judges is 21.5 per cent. There is still a considerable 
way to go before women in the judiciary reflect their prevalence among law graduates 
or in the general population. 
Judicial diversity obviously extends beyond gender to include many other attributes 
and experiences – including ethnic background, professional experience, education, 
socio-economic background, and sexuality. Although there are some data on other 
background characteristics of the Australian judiciary, this has traditionally been very 
limited.35 Lee and Campbell acknowledged that it may be ‘impossible to assemble 
relevant and reliable data’ on such questions ‘without seeking answers from individual 
judges to questionnaires which many judges would most probably regard as intrusive 
and perhaps even impertinent’. 36  While reliable statistics are hard to come by, it 
remains fair to assume that many Australian judges conform to the ‘judicial norm’ 
described by English jurist Sir Terence Etherton. He described the English judiciary as 
dominated by ‘the life experience of middle-class, white, heterosexual men, whose 
entire pre-judicial career has been as barristers in private practice’.37 
While most judicial appointments are received with professional approbation and 
public indifference, from time to time an Australian judicial appointment is greeted 
with considerable controversy. This has generally been due to concern that political 
                                                        
31  Ibid 11. 
32  <http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/home/justice+system/courts+and+tribunals/judicial+appointments>. 
(17062017) 
33  See further discussion in Opeskin, ‘The State of the Judicature’, above n 22. 
34  This calculation is based on the figures contained in Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 
Judicial Gender Statistics 2017, available at: <https://aija.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/JudgesMagistrates.pdf> 
35  Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu have obtained some data on these attributes in their national 
survey: Mack and Roach Anleu, ‘The National Survey of Australian Judges’, above n 6. 
36  HP Lee and E Campbell, The Australian Judiciary (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2013), 36-
37. See further, Opeskin, ‘The State of the Judicature’, above n 22, 512-13. 
37  Sir Terence Etherton, ‘Liberty, the Archetype and Diversity: A Philosophy of Judging’ [2010] 
Public Law 727, 746. 
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considerations have been influential in the selection of particular candidates, or whether 
the candidate in question has the appropriate character and experience for the office. 
The appointment of Murphy J to the High Court and, more recently, in 2014, 
Carmody CJ to the Supreme Court of Queensland are notable examples. 38  The 
appointment and tenure of Carmody CJ was particularly notable in that we saw current 
and former members of the Queensland judiciary speak out about his appointment. 
While rare, there have been a number of occasions when current and former members 
of the judiciary have entered the debate about appointments. For instance, the 
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration released, in 2015, a set of ‘Suggested 
Criteria for Judicial Appointment’, which it sent to all Attorneys-General and Shadow 
Attorneys-General. Individual judges have also expressed their views. 39  Stephen 
Gageler, before he was appointed to the High Court, wrote on judicial appointments, 
noting particularly that merit alone would be unlikely to be a sufficient criteria and that 
‘considerations of geography, gender and ethnicity all can, and should, legitimately 
weigh in the balance’.40 He articulated his own ideal judicial appointments process: 
I would have one method for identifying the pool of potential judicial candidates and another 
for choosing amongst them. Both stages would be transparent. The first stage would be solely 
concerned with identifying persons having what I have described as the essential judicial 
attributes. At the second stage, I would be happy to see the broader considerations to which I 
have referred openly brought to the fore and debated.41 
Nonetheless, we have limited understanding of the wider judiciary’s views on the 
current system and possible reform of the appointments system. It is against this 
background of traditional practice, modest reform, recent controversy and limited 
understanding of the judicial perspective that we sought judicial views of the existing 
appointments processes across Australia. 
B. Survey Data 
Figure 4 illustrates the responses to questions asking first to what extent the respondent 
agreed that various aspects of the judicial appointments system were a challenge facing 
the judiciary in their jurisdiction (Qs 1a, 1b and 1c) and then to more specific 
propositions based upon the Bingham Report discussion of this topic across its survey 
of Commonwealth countries (Qs 2-5). The graphs show the percentage of respondents 
to that question who answered strongly agree (SA), agree (A), Neutral (N), Disagree 
(D) or Strongly Disagree (SD). Discussion on each follows Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Appointments Process 
                                                        
38  Gabrielle Appleby and Suzanne Le Mire, ‘The Australian Judiciary: Resistant to Reform?’ in R 
Devlin and A Dodek (eds) Regulating Judges (Edward Elgar, 2016) 38-39. 
39  Available at: https://aija.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Suggested-Criteria-for-Judicial-
Appointments-AIJA-2015.pdf. 
40  Stephen Gageler, ‘Judicial Appointment’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 159, 160 




1 Integrity of Appointments Process 
The responses to the proposition that the ‘integrity of appointments process’ is a 
challenge showed that judicial officers remain concerned about current appointments 
processes. Of the 142 respondents, 56 per cent agreed or strongly agreed with the 
proposition, 22 per cent were neutral and only 22 per cent disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with it. A number of participants expressed satisfaction with the integrity of 
the current appointments process: 
Canvas, interview, recommend, appoint; all good (Male, 5–9 years’ service, NSW, 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
In my experience judicial appointees possess outstanding integrity (Male, 10–14 years’ service, 
NSW, Magistrates/Local). 
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Those who agreed integrity of appointments presented a challenge gave a variety of 
reasons. For some it was about the potential for politics to creep, inappropriately, into 
the process: 
In all jurisdictions I observe appointments being made, some of which do not appear to 
be addressing the needs of a particular court, rather the appointment of people who are 
simply mates of the current attorney, or who are appointed as a political favour designed 
to repay past obligations, or to open up that person’s previous position for future 
advantage. Even if only 25% of appointment are made in this way, the reputation and 
efficiency of the court concerned is severely compromised. (Female, 25+ years’ service, 
NSW, District/County/Federal Circuit). Indeed, for a number of respondents from 
Queensland, the Carmody appointment was front of mind:  
The premier’s determination to appoint a partisan, under-qualified Chief Justice, with 
the boast that the appointee had the full support of the editor of the Courier Mail shortly 
after a recent change in editor was gravely worrying. (Demographic data omitted) 
Several judicial officers explained their negative views of the integrity of appointments 
by referring to a lack of transparency and consistency: 
Appointments are still entirely in the gift of the AG [Attorney-General], and are 
shrouded in mystery. The process changes from government to government and Attorney 
to Attorney, leaving governments and appointees alike subject to criticism for lack of 
transparency, favouritism, bias and ‘stacking’ (Female, 10–14 years’ service, Vic, 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Articulating the complexity of reforming the judicial appointments system, one 
respondent said: 
The more that arguments are advanced for any criteria for appointment outside of 
apparent independence and merit (based on intellect, personality and experience) the 
greater the challenge – those who would have diversity or ‘representative’ appointments 
bring the soft corruption of those who would appoint political favourites with them, 
because appointment can be justified on grounds other than merit. Look at the recent 
Queensland fiasco [referring presumably to the appointment of Chief Justice Carmody] 
(Male, 0–4 years’ service, Qld, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
2 Quality of Appointments 
The responses to the proposition that ‘quality of appointments’ was a challenge showed 
that judicial officers are also concerned about the quality of appointments resulting 
from the current processes (Figure 4). Of the 142 respondents, 58 per cent agreed or 
strongly agreed with the proposition, 24 per cent were neutral and only 18 per cent 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with it.  
These responses revealed a correlation with gender, with female respondents more 
critical of the quality of appointments. Some 71 per cent of female respondents agreed 
or strongly agreed that the quality of appointments was a challenge, compared to only 
47 per cent of male respondents. Male respondents were more likely to be neutral (29 
per cent) or disagree or strongly disagree (24 per cent) than female respondents (14.5 
and 14.5 per cent respectively).  
One respondent focused on qualities that they thought were currently overlooked: 
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Courtroom experience is underrated as a prerequisite. Trial courts have big reserve lists 
and it is important to have judges who can hit the ground running. There should also be 
more court of appeal appointments from experienced trial lawyers rather than those 
practising primarily in the rather artificial environs of the court of appeal. We get far too 
many trials overturned on overly technical bases, or sentences trifled with due to a lack 
of trial experience in court of appeal judges. It is a flaw in our system, where practitioners 
specialise, that appeal judges often sit on cases in areas of law where they are entirely 
inexperienced leading to overly technical and stilted decision making. (Female, 10–14 
years’ service, Vic, District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Two respondents were interested in the extent to which judicial roles appealed to 
potential candidates, particularly in light of the different benefits that apply at different 
jurisdictional levels: 
I think most appointments are, by and large, sound. However there are clearly some 
excellent candidates who are not appointed. It has to be accepted that some of these may 
have declined for reasons best known to them. It cannot be said that the bench is for 
everyone. It is better if those qualified who hold that view vis-a-vis themselves decline 
appointment. Nevertheless it would be worth studying what discourages some apparently 
eminently qualified practitioners from accepting appointment. (Female, 10–14 years’ 
service, NSW, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
While well paid, the absence of medical retirement, the poor leave entitlements and 
restrictions around superannuation contributions make it [an appointment to a lower 
court] less attractive than other jurisdictions. (Female, 15–19 years’ service, NSW, 
Magistrates/Local). 
Another respondent expressed concern as to the consequences of appointment of 
variable quality candidates: 
We have had a number of appointees who are not skilled to perform their role in this 
jurisdiction which creates a corresponding burden on colleagues. (Female, 10–14 years’ 
service, Federal, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
3 Judicial Diversity 
Responses to the proposition that ‘judicial diversity’ was a challenge again showed that 
judicial officers are concerned about the diversity of appointments resulting from the 
current process (Figure 4). Of the 142 respondents, 53 per cent agreed or strongly 
agreed with the proposition, 30 per cent were neutral and only 18 per cent disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with it. 
The responses to this question also revealed a correlation with gender, with female 
judges again emerging as more concerned about diversity. Female respondents were 
more likely than male respondents to indicate that diversity was a challenge: 71 per 
cent of female respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition, while only 
47 per cent of male judicial officers did so. At the other end of the scale, 5 per cent of 
male respondents strongly disagreed that diversity posed a challenge, compared with 
no female judicial officers doing so. 
Some participants who agreed that diversity was a challenge cited ongoing barriers to 
appointing diverse candidates: 
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People advising and making appointments tend to like and recommend people who are 
similar to themselves. Insufficient regard is had in all jurisdictions to the appointment of 
qualified, experienced people, but with a non-standard background, or even gender!!! 
(Female, 25+ years’ service, NSW, District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Others noted that diversity was not simply a gender issue: 
Gender diversity is far from the only problem. Diversity in terms of socio-economic 
background and racial and ethnic diversity also need attention. The effect that longevity 
in the legal profession (and rising into its senior ranks) seems to have an increasing 
conservatism of outlook, work practices, attitudes to activities outside the law, attitudes 
to family responsibilities generally needs to be addressed. These things cannot really be 
addressed without addressing diversity in the legal profession generally - that is, the pool 
of quality and experienced candidates coming through. (Female, 0–4 years’ service, 
Federal, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Several of those who did not view diversity as a challenge expressed doubts about the 
value of diversity itself, indicating they were unconvinced by the arguments that have 
been made in favour of it: 
I do not agree with diversity for its own sake. Judges make individual decisions, rather 
than collective decisions. What is more important is balance possessed by each judge, 
not balance across the court. (Male, 10–14 years’ service, Qld, District/County/Federal 
Circuit) 
The intelligent experienced judicial officer is better equipped to implement Parliament’s 
social agenda than an inexperienced officer from a “diverse” social background. (Male, 
0–4 years’ service, Vic, District/County/Federal Circuit). 
There is no doubt that governments both say that they are appointing on diversity 
grounds and are doing so. Diversity is not merit. Who asks if their surgeon or engineer 
comes from a diverse background? Or is law no longer a learned profession? (Male, 0–
4 years’ service, Qld, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
4 Compliance with Best-Practice Appointment 
The next question with respect to appointments explored what a best-practice version 
of an executive-only appointment model might look like. It suggested that such a model 
should be buttressed by a number of safeguards in order to be ‘reliable and legitimate’. 
The question was prefaced by the following passage from the Bingham Report: 
Executive-only appointment systems… require a combination of legal safeguards and settled 
political conventions in order to be a reliable and legitimate means of appointing judges. The 
precise mix may differ between jurisdictions, but should include at least transparency regarding 
the criteria for appointment and the procedures followed, a requirement of consultation with 
senior judicial officers and possibly also opposition politicians, and ideally the existence of an 
independent body to provide oversight and deal with complaints.42 
Respondents were then asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that the current 
arrangements for appointing judicial officers in their jurisdiction satisfied the Bingham 
Report’s description of minimal ‘best practice’. Some 47 per cent of judicial officers 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that their jurisdiction complied with the Bingham’s 
                                                        
42  van Zyl Smit, above n 17, 24. 
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reports description of best practice; 22 per cent were neutral and 31 per cent agreed or 
strongly agreed that their jurisdiction met best practice. 
Several respondents took issue with the Bingham Report’s description of best practice: 
I do not accept that that report describes best practice. While there is scope for improving 
transparency in appointments, all these measures proved in practice to be a waste. 
Applicants for judicial office writing essays is ridiculous. The bureaucratic process leads 
to long delays in appointments. (Male, 0–4 years’ service, NSW, 
Supreme/Federal/Family). 
I do not agree with the proposition that the quoted passage is appropriately regarded as 
“... a minimal best practice.” It is not. I strongly do not agree with the proposition that 
opposition politicians should be consulted, nor that an independent body should provide 
some undefined “oversight”. (Male, 5–9 years’ service, NSW, 
Supreme/Federal/Family). 
I mostly agree, but I am not sure about the independent body to provide oversight. That 
could turn easily into a second-guessing of appointments, by a group of people who 
themselves have been appointed. As I said, I think the best modifier of extremities in the 
appointment process is a strong and respectful working relationship between the Chief 
Justice of the jurisdiction, and the executive and Attorney of the day. Too much 
‘oversight’ can lead to compromise appointments and actually be a dampener on 
diversity. (Female, 0–4 years’ service, Federal, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
5 Alternative Modes of Appointment 
The possibility of adding an additional process incorporating a judicial commission or 
some form of legislative responsibility was explored in the next three questions of the 
survey. The Bingham Report had stated that just 18.7 per cent of Commonwealth 
jurisdictions appoint all judicial officers using an ‘executive-only’ model (though a 
greater percentage employ this method for highest courts and/or the position of Chief 
Justice). 43  In other Commonwealth jurisdictions there is ‘some decision-making 
responsibility given to the legislature, or a judicial appointments commission’. 44 
Respondents were initially asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that it is 
appropriate that the executive retain sole decision-making responsibility for appointing 
judicial officers. 
The responses to this question showed a remarkable degree of symmetry, with 40 per 
cent agreeing or strongly agreeing that the executive should retain sole-decision making 
power while 40 per cent disagreed or strong disagreed (Figure 4). Twenty per cent 
indicated neutrality. 
Comments from those who disagreed with the retention of unadorned executive 
discretion over judicial appointments focused on the potential for ‘manipulation’ of the 
                                                        
43  Ibid, 16. 
44  Ibid, 25. 
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process 45  and a concern that the ‘motivation to appoint a person who will act 
independently without fear or favour is decreased in this method’.46 
While there was no statistically significant association between gender and response 
for the question, there was some indication that female respondents were more likely 
than males to disagree with the executive holding sole decision-making power: 49 per 
cent of females disagreed or strongly disagreed, compared with 32 per cent of males. It 
is possible that this reflects the greater female concern about diversity, which some 
comments referenced. Several female judicial officers who disagreed saw the shift 
away from an ‘executive only’ model as providing an opportunity to enhance diversity: 
An independent judicial appointments body is vital if gender balance and diversity is to 
be achieved at all levels of the judiciary. (Demographic data omitted). 
The remaining two questions on appointments processes tested the acceptability of two 
possible additions to the executive-only model. First, judicial officers were asked about 
whether involving the legislature would be appropriate or desirable. Second, 
participants were consulted about the addition of a judicial appointments commission 
(Figure 4). Judicial officers did not find legislative involvement appealing: 64 per cent 
of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that this would be appropriate or 
desirable, while only 17 per cent agreed or strongly agreed.  
Not unexpectedly, several comments reflected a fear that such a process would 
increase the likelihood that politics would intrude: 
Politicises the process. Governments of the day (the executive) are elected to make 
decisions such as appointments. The balance is struck by the democratic process of 
changing governments and therefore changing appointment decision makers from time 
to time. (Female, 15–19 years’ service, Vic, Magistrates/Local). 
Others couched this concern more expressly in terms of a diminishment of the 
separation of powers: 
Umm. Separation of powers? (Female, 15–19 years’ service, NSW, Magistrates/Local) 
This sounds risky. It might work if the Bingham safeguards existed but it is not 
institutionally desirable in terms of separation of powers - could lead to populism and 
elected judges by default (Female, 25+ years’ service, Qld, Supreme/Federal/Family) 
Respondents were also asked whether it is appropriate or desirable that an independent 
judicial appointments commission be established and conferred with some decision-
making responsibility (including the preparation of a shortlist of candidates from which 
the government must appoint) in the process for appointing judicial officers. There was 
a majority view of 55 per cent that a judicial commission would be desirable, with 29 
per cent disagreeing. 
                                                        
45  Female, 10-14 years’ service, Vic, District/County/Federal Circuit. 
46  Demographic data omitted. 
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Few comments were made to elaborate these responses. Those who agreed and 
commented saw a judicial commission as a significant step towards a more appropriate 
appointments process: 
This provides a greater likelihood of a fair, transparent selection and vetting process. It 
will enable candidates who don’t “look like” their predecessors to be considered, and 
give greater confidence in the independence from the government of the day from the 
selection and vetting process. (Female, 10–14 years’ service, Vic, 
District/County/Federal Circuit) 
Several who disagreed expressed concern about the likely composition and effect of 
such a body: 
An independent judicial appointments commission would be reflective of the elite of the 
profession making judgements based upon their own particular worldviews. They are 
not elected therefore they are not reflective of any particular base. It would be similar to 
allowing the Bar Councils to make appointments. Same old boy bent. (Female, 15–19 
years’ service, Vic, Magistrates/Local). 
C. Discussion 
Integrity of appointments process, quality of appointments and judicial appointments 
were all identified by 50 per cent or more respondents as current challenges in their 
jurisdiction. This flies in the face of the easy trope that the judges themselves are, of 
course, satisfied with the appointments system; after all, they were appointed under it. 
This level of concern may reflect the high profile controversy that ensued from the 
elevation of Tim Carmody to the position of Chief Justice of Queensland that was recent 
at the time the survey was put into the field. But even so, the survey results offer a clear 
affirmation that the topic of judicial appointments remains a fertile area for debate and 
further research. This is despite the fairly sustained academic and judicial comment that 
the issue of appointment processes has received over the last few decades. While some 
jurisdictions have taken steps to increase the transparency and rigor of the appointment 
process, these remain the exception and there does not appear to be much political 
appetite in Australia for further or more widespread reform. Indeed, in the case of the 
Commonwealth, the enhanced consultation processes implemented in 2008 appears to 
have been used since the change of government in 2013. This lack of political will 
stands in contrast to what this survey reveals about judicial interest in reform. With the 
data indicating that a majority of judicial officers (55 per cent) were in favour of the 
creation of an independent commission, it seems that this issue is far from exhausted. 
The survey also reveals a significant correlation between those judges concerned about 
the issue of integrity, quality and diversity of appointments, and gender. This provides 
us with a reminder of the importance of reflecting on the way different judicial officers 
experience their role and that, as other academic work has found, women experience 
the judicial life differently.47 It suggests that the current appointments process, with all 
                                                        
47  See, for instance, Mack and Roach Anleu, ‘In-Court Judicial Behaviours, Gender and Legitimacy’ 
above n 10; Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (eds), Gender and Judging (Hart, 2013); Erika 
Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary: From Difference to Diversity (Routledge, 2014). 
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its focus on increasing representativeness of the judiciary, still remains of acute concern 
to the group which is supposed to have benefited from that focus. It also suggests that 
progress to a more diverse judiciary might be advanced with greater understanding of 
the challenges and experiences of women judicial officers themselves. 
The responses in relation to the reform of the appointments process also provide a 
salutary reminder of how complex reform can be in this area, the myriad factors that 
need to be considered, and the potential unintended negative consequences of a 
particular reform, such as an independent commission. 
Finally, the data generate a note of caution about relying too heavily on judicial 
perceptions and ideas in relation to judicial regulation and reform. While they might 
provide an illuminating and important perspective, they should be supplemented with 
other evidence. For instance, the suggestion by one respondent that an independent 
appointments body might increase diversity, has been disproven in other jurisdictions 
by longitudinal study. The experience in England and Wales suggests that a reform of 
this type may not produce the dramatic change for which this particular respondent is 
hoping. Since the inception of the Judicial Appointments Commission in England and 
Wales in 2006 the ‘diversity deficit’ in England and Wales has proved to be stubbornly 
persistent, with only modest advances in the percentage of women, and minimal change 
in the numbers of judicial officers identifying as ‘black, Asian or minority ethnic’.48 
Significantly, the upper echelons of the English court structure have been especially 
impervious to any broadening in the diversity of the bench.49 These results have led one 
commentator to argue that this should be addressed by returning power to the 
executive.50 
 
V. JUDICIAL WORKING LIFE 
A. Context 
Once appointed, there are myriad dimensions to a judge’s working life. These 
undoubtedly differ depending on the particular court to which they have been 
appointed, and also their occupancy of any special position within that institution. So 
much is obviously true of any attempt to compare different work environments in a 
particular profession. Accordingly, it is important to refer to the demographic 
information accompanying survey responses on this broad topic so as to appreciate 
these differences between jurisdiction and seniority.  
In this section, we consider the judicial working life in six respects: 
                                                        
48  See Graham Gee and Erika Rackley, ‘Diversity and the JAC’s First Ten Years’ in Graham Gee and 
Erika Rackley (eds), Debating Judicial Appointments in an Age of Diversity (Routledge, 2018) 1. 
49  Ibid 6-9. 
50  Graham Gee, ‘Rethinking the Lord Chancellor’s Role in Judicial Appointments’ (2017) 20(1) Legal 
Ethics 4, 6. 
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- the impact of judges in an acting (or ‘temporary’) capacity; 
- the impact of part-time judges; 
- the education and ethical support provided to judges; 
- the judicial workload, staffing and support; 
- judicial remuneration and pensions; and 
- retirement age. 
B. Survey Data 
The responses to the relevant survey questions are illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Judicial Working Life 
 
 
1 Acting Judges 
A reliance on acting judges to perform the work of the courts can arouse strong 
opinions, particularly in relation to the perceived threat that their appointment may pose 
to the principle of judicial independence. In the 2006 High Court case of Forge v 
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Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Kirby J, when considering whether 
New South Wales legislative provisions allowing the appointment of acting judges to 
the NSW Supreme Court were constitutional, asserted in his dissenting opinion that the 
‘time has come … to draw a line and forbid the practice’ at least so far as he appreciated 
its operation in the particular context of that case.51 At the same time such appointments 
can assist the courts, and hence serve the public interest, in significant ways. They may 
allow for the appropriate management of conflicts of interest, strengthen a bench that 
is depleted due to temporary illness or unavailability, and provide a cost effective way 
to manage short-term workload pressures. 
In Australia, while all states and territories provide for some form of acting appointment 
(they are prohibited in federal courts pursuant to s 72 of the Constitution), the 
regulatory arrangements are highly varied and there is often little transparency around 
the use of acting judges. There are variances horizontally across the states and territories 
and vertically between courts within a jurisdiction. Victoria is the only jurisdiction with 
a consistent approach to regulation, applying the same clear legislative rules for all 
acting positions across all court levels with respect to appointment; eligibility; terms of 
office; renewal; mandatory retirement age; salary and entitlements; outside work; and 
security of tenure. This Australia-wide variability reveals that there is little principled 
consideration underpinning the different arrangements relating to the appointment, 
conditions, remuneration and termination of acting judges.52 It is against this backdrop 
that we sought judicial views on their use.  
The responses to the proposition that the use of acting judges was a challenge showed 
that judicial opinions were mixed. Of the 142 respondents, 34 per cent agreed or 
strongly agreed that this is a challenge, 37 per cent indicated neutrality and 29 per cent 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
These responses, together with the associated comments, support the proposition that 
arguments can be marshalled both in favour and against the use of acting judges, but 
that some disquiet existed among the judicial officers surveyed about the 
appropriateness of the current approach. 
Two demographic variables were correlated with different responses: gender and level 
of court. Female respondents were slightly more likely to indicate that the use of acting 
judges was a challenge. By court level, those respondents from superior courts (the 
Supreme, Federal and Family Courts, n=34) were more likely not to see the use of 
acting judges as a challenge when compared with those respondents appointed to either 
the lower courts (Magistrates, Local, n=48) or the intermediate courts (District, County, 
Federal Circuit, n=48). However, care must be taken due to the fact that federal judges 
                                                        
51 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 94 [125]. Kirby J 
(at 117 [181]) acknowledged it was not the Court’s role ‘to pronounce on the “general desirability” 
of the appointment of acting judges’ and that although case had ‘potential significance for State 
courts other than the Supreme Court, it was ultimately focussed on the validity of appointments of 
acting judges in the Supreme Court of New South Wales’. 
52  See further Gabrielle Appleby, Suzanne Le Mire, Andrew Lynch and Brian Opeskin, Temporary 
Judicial Officers in Australia (2017, Judicial Conference of Australia). 
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are not exposed to temporary judicial appointments, and their concomitant challenges, 
due to the constitutional prohibition on such appointments. 
Comments indicated that the predominant perceived advantage of using acting judges 
was that they provided assistance with the management of workload demands. Typical 
comments were: 
As the appointment of acting judicial officers are made from the ranks of recently retired 
judicial officers the usual concerns about tailoring outcomes to ensure political favour is 
maintained does not occur. Without acting judicial officers, the efficient operation of the 
court during times of illness and the provision of out of hours services would be 
compromised. (Female; Magistrates/Local; NSW; 15-19 years’ service). 
Appointment of appropriate acting judicial officers may be an efficient way to deal with 
case backlogs. (Male; District/County/Federal Circuit; NSW; 10-14 years’ service). 
For another respondent the opportunity to ‘try before you buy’ was appealing: 
Trialling proposed new appointees for say 3 months is similarly not objectionable. Both 
the Court and appointees should have the opportunity for an obligation free fixed term 
trial.
 
(Female; District/County/Federal Circuit; NSW; 25+ years’ service). 
A number of negative responses focused on the threat to independence that was seen as 
accompanying temporary appointments: 
Easily perceived as not independent and not part of the body of permanent judicial 
officers ... also golf or surfing 3-4 days a week and one day work and to ensure full days 
salary string out the hearing of cases or get part heard to ensure more work. 
(Demographic data not provided). 
It is of concern when Acting JO’s [Judicial Officers] are used in substitute for permanent 
appointments. I am also concerned that acting appointments are subject to renewal at the 
instance of the AG and also the head of the court and this is a problem in terms of any 
potential impact upon independence of decision making. (Female; Magistrates/Local; 
Vic; 15-19 years’ service). 
They may feel constrained, because of lack of tenure, in acting entirely independently.
 
(Male; Magistrates/Local; WA; 5-9 years’ service). 
The State Government has been making use of Acting Magistrates over the past 5 years, 
instead of appointing additional magistrates. That has enabled the AG to select retiring 
magistrates whose approach, particularly to sentencing is consistent with the 
Government’s law and order agenda. At a time when magistrates have been forced to 
retire on their 65th birthday certain favoured retiring magistrates have been appointed as 
Acting magistrates up to their 70th birthday, whilst others who would like to continue 
working have not received such a commission. (Female; Magistrates/Local; WA; 10-14 
years’ service). 
Others noted the impact of drawing on the banks of retired judges, for instance: 
There is some discussion, maybe even concern about the number of retired appeal judges 
returning to the Court of Appeal. Given the small number of appeal judges, and the 
capacity of a small number of them to exercise a disproportionate influence on appellate 
decisions, there is concern about the lack of renewal usually provided for by retirement. 
This is compounded by the 8-year window post retirement for appointment as an acting 
judge. (Female; District/County/Federal Circuit; Vic; 10-14 years). 
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A few responses demonstrated empathy for the acting judges and indicated that drawing 
on acting judges could raise concerns about the degree to which such judges were being 
appropriately managed and supported: 
Ok provided that they are given the same resources such as bench books, lap tops etc to 
keep them up to date with the changes in the law. (Female; Magistrates/Local; NSW; 
15-19 years’ service). 
It’s unfair of the government to appoint acting Judges 5 or 6 times and then not appoint 
them to the position.
 
(Male; District/County/Federal Circuit; WA; 5-9 years’ service). 
Subject to continuity of work to keep up to date. (Male; Magistrates/Local; NSW; 25+ 
years’ service). 
2 Part-time Judges 
The survey also explored judicial perceptions of the use of part-time judges. The 
judicial role has, like most professions, traditionally been conceived of as a full-time 
one. The Council of Chief Justices wrote in 2007: 
[J]udicial office is a full-time occupation and the timely discharge of judicial duties must take 
priority over any non-judicial activity.53 
As the Chief Justices note, this view is arguably informed by the need to ensure the 
efficient administration of justice, and for judges to largely remove themselves from 
non-judicial commitments while holding office so as to avoid real and apprehended 
conflicts of interest,54 or the danger of bringing themselves or the judicial institution 
into disrepute. The Law Council of Australia has expressed concerns that part-time 
appointments may be used by governments to avoid meeting their obligations to staff 
the judiciary adequately.55 This seems to anticipate that government may establish part-
time judicial positions, effectively imposing them on the courts, rather than such an 
appointment being at the election of those judges seeking flexible working conditions. 
Today, the need for flexible and part-time working arrangements is an important part 
of achieving greater diversity across all workplaces, and the judiciary is no different. 
However the concerns about how part-time arrangements might affect the judiciary 
suggest that there is a need for some regulation of part-time appointments.56 In 2009, 
the Senate’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee concluded part-
time working arrangements ‘will be an issue of increasing importance in attracting and 
retaining many talented appointees’ and recommended the development of a protocol 
to encourage such arrangements in a manner that did not compromise the independence 
of the judiciary.57 
                                                        
53  Council of Chief Justices of Australia, Guide to Judicial Conduct (Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration, 3rd ed, 2017) cl 6.2 
54  See, eg, R v Lippé [1991] 2 SCR 114. 
55  Submission of the Law Council of Australia, referred to in the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs References Committee, Australia’s Judicial System and the Role of Judges (2009) 42.  
56  Brian Opeskin, ‘The Supply of Judicial Labour: Optimising a Scarce Resource in Australia’ (2017) 
7(4) Onati Socio-Legal Series. 847.  
57  Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, above n 48, [4.69] 47. 
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To date, part-time judges have been allowed only in lower courts across Australia, with 
New South Wales leading the charge in allowing part-time magistrates in 1999. Only 
in Victoria are part-time appointments allowed across all levels of the judiciary. Despite 
the allowance for part-time judicial appointments, there has been little appetite for 
actually making such appointments. In New South Wales, between the time that part-
time magisterial appointments were permitted in 1999 and 2014, only 4 of the 121 
appointments (3.3 per cent) made were part-time.58 This is consistent with the national 
figure recorded by Mack and Roach Anleu over a decade ago of only 8 part-time 
Magistrates out of 242 (3.3 per cent). 
It is against this backdrop that we sought judicial views on the use of part-time judicial 
officers in their jurisdictions (Figure 5). In the survey, the responses to the proposition 
that the use of part-time judicial officers was a challenge showed that judicial opinions 
were mixed. Of the 142 respondents, more than a third (39 per cent) of respondents 
were neutral about the proposition, with a third (32 per cent) agreeing and less than a 
third (29 per cent) disagreeing. 
Only one demographic variable – gender – was associated with different responses. 
Female respondents were slightly more likely to indicate that the use of part-time judges 
was a challenge in their jurisdiction, with almost half of male respondents indicating 
that they were neutral on the proposition. That the challenge of part-time appointments 
is more keenly felt by female judicial officers is perhaps explained by the largely 
gendered foundation that underpins the need for greater workplace flexibility.59 
Only a small number of comments articulated substantive concerns around part-time 
appointments: 
Fully tenured positions are critical to a robust and independent judiciary, as is stamina, focus 
and immersion in one’s judicial task. I don’t really see a role for part time judges. (Female; 0-4 
years’ service; Federal; Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Most of the comments against part-time appointments focussed on the difficulty it 
would create for the administration of the Court: 
Difficulties in management. By way of example, dealing with matters that have to be adjourned. 
Also raises concerns about the ability to ensure (as far as practicable) independence through 
tenure. (Male; 10-14 years’ service; Qld; District/County/Federal Circuit). 
This does not work as they never share the load of work claiming that they cannot hear lengthy 
cases due to not sitting full time. (Female; 15-19 years’ service; NSW; Magistrates/Local). 
While … flexibility is desirable for the judicial officer, managing listings and the allocation of 
cases becomes problematic. Fulfilling country commitments is also difficult when more and 
more judicial officers are seeking part time appointments. (Female; 15-19 years’ service; NSW; 
Magistrates/Local). 
                                                        
58  Opeskin, ‘The Supply of Judicial Labour’, above n 56. 
59  See, for example, the Commonwealth Workplace Gender Equality Agency, and their strategies on 
workplace flexibility: https://www.wgea.gov.au/lead/strategic-approach-flexibility  
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Other respondents supported the arguments in favour of part-time judicial 
appointments. For instance:  
Yes! This would result in more experienced and worthy judicial officers staying on longer, or 
happy to fill in once they have retired. A flexible work place is a quality work place. (Female; 
10-14 years’ service; Qld; District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Scope for part time judicial officers would make judicial appointment more available to persons 
with primary responsibility for the care of family. It would also avoid the early and unnecessary 
retirement of some individuals. (Male; 5-9 years’ service; Qld; Supreme/Federal/Family). 
3 Judicial Education 
To qualify for appointment, a judge must be of standing in the legal profession for a 
specified number of years, and, therefore, must have achieved minimum standards of 
education and experience. However, once appointed, there were traditionally no 
continuing educational requirements. Today, a number of national and state institutions 
provide continuing judicial education: the National Judicial College of Australia, the 
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, the Judicial Commission of NSW, the 
Judicial College of Victoria and the Judicial Conference of Australia. There is now a 
National Curriculum for Professional Development for Australian Judicial Officers 
(developed by the National Judicial College in 2005 in consultation with the courts and 
other judicial education bodies). In 2006, a national standard (albeit still voluntary) for 
judicial education of five days per year per judicial officer was prepared by the National 
Judicial College, and endorsed by the Council of Chief Justices of Australia, Chief 
Judges, Chief Magistrates, and other judicial representative and education bodies.60 A 
2010 review revealed that, while only one jurisdiction had formally adopted the 
standard, 68 per cent of judges met or exceeded the standard.61 
It is against this backdrop that we sought judicial views on the education of judicial 
officers. In the survey, the responses to the proposition that the education of judicial 
officers was a challenge were overwhelmingly in agreement, with 54 per cent of 
respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the proposition, 23 per cent neutral and 
only 24 per cent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing (Figure 5).  
For some respondents, gains that have been made in recent years had meant judicial 
education was no longer a ‘challenge’, although it should be an ongoing commitment. 
One respondent indicated the question of judicial education ‘no longer arouses 
passions, but was now “just part of the landscape”’.62 Many of these comments came 
from those jurisdictions with established local judicial education institutions: 
I think there is a strong system of judicial education in Australia and a positive approach to 
undertaking programs. (Female, 15-19 years’ service, Qld, District/County/Federal Circuit) 
                                                        
60  Christopher Roper, National Standard for Professional Development for Australian Judicial 
Officers (2006). 
61  Christopher Roper, Review of the National Standard for Professional Development for Australian 
Judicial Officers (December 2010) 9. 
62  Female, 10-14 years’ service, Vic, District/County/Federal Circuit.62 
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This issue has improved dramatically since I was appointed in 1994 with the advent of the NCJA 
and a much greater recognition of the need for on-going education of judicial officers in all 
aspects of their role. When I was first appointed, the focus was on the law - fascinating papers 
on Mareva injunctions and the like, but now issues such as court room conduct, personal stress, 
and input from other disciplines (psychology, sociology, criminology etc.) are part of most 
education programmes. (Male, 20-24 years’ service, Qld, District/County/Federal Circuit). 
However, a number of responses indicated that some judicial officers appreciated the 
importance of structured, organised ongoing judicial education, which they saw as 
lacking in some jurisdictions: 
I think education is done better in those jurisdictions with a Judicial College. I think in the other 
jurisdictions, education is more ad hoc. At leave time, it is often difficult to find conferences 
that are truly educational. (Female, 0-4 years’ service, Qld, District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Resourcing and time constraints were identified by a number of respondents as 
undermining judicial education: 
Very little time made available for continuing education (Male, 5-9 years’ service, WA, 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Funding of education is inadequate. (Male, 0-4 years’ service, WA, District/County/Federal 
Circuit). 
Magistrates get the short straw being required to pay for their own textbooks to keep up to date. 
It’s an absolute disgrace. (Female, 15-19 years’ service, NSW, Magistrates/Local). 
Others doubted the adequacy of what was being provided, which may be attributable to 
the lack of funding: 
Judicial Education with respect to magistrates is very poorly resourced. In recent years the Chief 
Magistrate has increased the number of days per year to 4 days however magistrates themselves, 
unlike other jurisdictions are expected to fund education themselves with minimal contribution 
from the Department of the Attorney General. Consequently CLE consists mainly of magistrates 
doing presentations for the group, or a judge delivering a paper on an issue, or organizations 
who deliver services to offenders, or other court users, who want face time with magistrates 
presenting their programme or service. This does not engender fresh ideas, or new approaches 
or innovation. (Female, 10-14 years’ service, WA, Magistrates/Local). 
While there is a large investment in judicial education in NSW, I doubt the efficiency with 
which judicial education is delivered and the usefulness of much of what is delivered. The main 
problems are (a) judges and magistrates are not well-trained in delivery of adult education and 
(b) the approach taken is largely “one size fits all”. Thus much of the effort is either ill-directed 
or of very limited use to the recipients. Like much CPD in the legal profession generally. (Male, 
20-24 years’ service, NSW, Magistrates/Local). 
Finally, one respondent expressed his concern about the voluntary nature of current 
judicial education standards: 
The real problem has always been there, and that is, the small number of people who would 
most benefit from such programmes do not attend! (Male, 20-24 years’ service, Qld, 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
4 Ethical Support for Judges 
The ethical standards of judicial officers have traditionally been perceived as a matter 
for individual judges to determine for themselves. The more contemporary approach 
has been to develop a set of standards that can guide judicial conduct, such as the Guide 
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to Judicial Conduct, published for the Council of Chief Justices of Australia.63 Beyond 
these standards, judges are left to consider ethical dilemmas with little formal 
institutional support. As the judiciary, and the legal profession from which it is drawn, 
becomes larger and, albeit slowly, more diverse – in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, 
religion, sexuality, class, education, age and geographic region – it becomes less likely 
that there will be common understandings as to the way the judicial role should be 
performed.64 This may extend to shared, implicit ethical values to difficult dilemmas. 
Questions thus arise as to whether this traditional approach remains adequate. 
The question relating to ethical support asked judicial officers to indicate the extent to 
which ‘ethical support’ was a challenge in their jurisdiction. There was a fairly balanced 
response, with 35 per cent agreeing or strongly agreeing, 37 per cent neutral, and 28 
per cent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the proposition. Only one 
demographic factor was correlated with different responses, namely, the level of court. 
Those respondents from lower courts (Magistrates, n=48) or the intermediate courts 
(District/County/Federal Circuit, n=48) were more likely to see the lack of ethical 
support as a challenge when compared with respondents appointed to superior courts 
(Supreme/ Federal/Family Courts, n=34). 
Some comments described the ‘traditional’ model and indicated their high level of 
comfort with it: 
Ethical support is informal, via discussions with other judges and head of jurisdiction, who are 
always helpful. (Male, 10-14 years’ service, Qld, District/County/Federal Ct) 
The collegiate nature of most judicial bodies is one of the great strengths. (Male, 0-4 years’ 
service, Qld, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
In addition to the informal support of colleagues and heads of jurisdiction, one 
respondent referred to the soft law ethical support for judges:  
The AIJA Guide on behalf of the Council of Chief Justices of Australia, is an invaluable 
resource in this area, and I would consult it at least once a month. (male, 20-24 years’ service, 
Qld, District/County/Federal Ct). 
Some respondents revealed concerns about the management of ethical support at the 
senior level within the judiciary. It appeared that this was dependent on the individual 
filling the role of head of jurisdiction. For example:  
I think it depends on your court. We have a Chief Judge who is very supportive and provides 
good counsel. (Female, 15-19 years’ service, Qld, District/County/Federal Ct). 
One respondent noted possible consequences of a growing and more diverse judiciary 
on the traditional ethical advisory model. This respondent believed that growing 
diversity ought to be viewed as a positive development: 
This tends to come informally through colleagues, which works well - as it also does, for 
example, at the Bar, in my experience. But such practices depend on like minded people being 
able to confide in each other, which in turns means you need a sufficiently diverse and 
                                                        
63  Council of Chief Justices of Australia, Guide to Judicial Conduct (Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration, 3rd ed, 2017). 
64 Mack and Roach Anleu, ‘In-Court Judicial Behaviours, Gender and Legitimacy’ above n 10, 729.  
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approachable judiciary for everyone to find their ‘buddies’ (female, 0-4 years’ service, Federal, 
Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Some respondents explained that they would like to see more formalised systems of 
ethical support in place. A number of respondents made comments to this effect, with 
suggestions for possible models: 
I think a more structured mentoring system would help in this area. As a relatively new judge, 
whilst my court is extremely collegiate, it is nevertheless quite isolating and others give the 
impression of being very self sufficient. (Female, 0-4 years’ service, Qld, District 
Court/County/Federal Ct). 
Each Court should designate a retired Judge who is available to assist in this regard. (Male, 5-9 
years’ service, WA, District/County/Federal Circuit). 
There needs to be a federated group of judicial commissions, with one secretariat to provide 
guidance and if needed investigation and recommendation for removal applying to all judges 
and magistrates. The standards need to be consistent Australia wide. (Male, 10-14 years’ 
service, Federal, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Evidencing why some judges may feel reluctant to seek ethical support and counsel 
from colleagues, one respondent commented:  
If you need ethical support you shouldn’t be in the job. (Female, 15-19 years’ service, NSW, 
Magistrates/Local). 
5 Judicial Workload, Staffing and Support 
There is an increasing trend to measure the productivity of the courts by reference to 
various metrics. Since 1995, the Productivity Commission’s annual Report on 
Government Services has contained a chapter on the work of the courts.65 This provides 
annual statistics on the budget and staffing of courts across the Federation, as well as 
their annual caseloads – including cases lodged and finalised. It also contains an 
assessment of the ‘key performance indicators’, which includes judicial numbers 
(relative to population), backlog and clearance of cases. These indicators have been 
subject to robust criticism by academics and members of the judiciary. Indeed, in 
relation to judicial workload, we probably have our most developed sense of the 
judiciary’s views. Former New South Wales Chief Justice James Spigelman has said 
‘the most important aspects of the work of the courts are qualitative and cannot be 
measured’.66  Opeskin has observed that the Productivity Commission ‘has not yet 
found a suitable indicator of the quality of courts for its annual review of government 
services’.67 
Mack and Roach Anleu’s 2007 judicial survey revealed a number of aspects of working 
conditions that judicial officers identify as a cause of dissatisfaction, including policies 
and administration, control over amount of work, scope for improving the court system, 
court facilities, and availability of adequate support.68 In that research, many judges 
                                                        
65 Opeskin, ‘The State of the Judicature’, above n 22, 491. 
66  James Spigelman, ‘Measuring Court Performance’ (2006) 16(2) Journal of Judicial Administration 
69, 70. 
67  Opeskin, ‘The Supply of Judicial Labour’, above n 56, 17. 
68  Mack and Roach Anleu, ‘The National Survey of Australian Judges’, above n 6, 17-18. 
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were also reported as regarding the volume of work as a source of stress.69 Anne 
Wallace, Mack and Roach Anleu have also conducted significant studies into the more 
specific question of judicial workload allocation – including allocating cases to lists or 
cases to judicial officers – across Australia.70  They argue that the task of judicial 
workload allocation requires a delicate balancing of competing principles relating to 
efficiency, fairness, impartiality and independence, which will often contain implicit 
evaluation of judicial performance.71  The proper funding of courts in Australia is 
fundamental to addressing concerns over judicial workload, staffing and support. In 
Australia, it is the executive and the legislature who have final say over judicial funding 
levels. As former Chief Justice of the High Court, Robert French, pointed out, profound 
issues are at stake when court funding is considered:  
It is difficult because it must respect the independence of the judicial branch and because it 
requires judgments about needs and efficiency where criteria to guide such judgments are 
difficult to define with precision.72 
Wayne Martin, the Chief Justice of Western Australia, warned that the effect of reduced 
or stable judicial numbers, and freezes on the employment of support staff, in the face 
of rising demand is that ‘delays compounded the losses suffered by victims and 
corrupted the judicial process’.73 As Sir Gerard Brennan has explained: 
[T]he courts are not an Executive agency … The courts cannot trim their judicial functions. 
They are bound to hear and determine cases brought within their jurisdiction. If they were 
constrained to cancel sittings or declined to hear the cases that they are bound to entertain, the 
rule of law would be immediately imperilled. This would not be merely a problem of increasing 
the backlog; it would be a problem of failing to provide the dispute resolving mechanism that 
is the precondition of the rule of law.74 
In the survey, respondents were asked in two separate questions about the extent to 
which they agreed that ‘workload’ and ‘staffing and support’ were a challenge in their 
jurisdiction. The responses were overwhelmingly in agreement, with 77 per cent of 
respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that workload posed a challenge, and 73 per 
cent agreeing or strongly agreeing that staffing and support also did so (Figure 5). 
Only one demographic factor was correlated with different responses, namely the level 
of court. Those respondents from superior courts (Supreme/Federal/Family Courts, 
                                                        
69  Ibid 18. 
70  Kathy Mack, Anne Wallace and Sharyn Roach Anleu (2012). Judicial Workload: Time, Tasks and 
Work Organisation. Melbourne, VIC: Australian Institute of Judicial Administration. 
71  See published studies from this research in: Wallace, Mack and Roach Anleu, ‘Work Allocation in 
Australian Courts’, above n 10; Anne Wallace, Sharyn Roach Anleu and Kathy Mack, ‘Evaluating 
judicial performance for caseload allocation’ (2015) 41 Monash University Law Review 445. 
72  Chief Justice RS French, ‘Boundary Conditions – The Funding of Courts within a Constitutional 
Framework’ (Speech at the Australian Court Administrators’ Group Conference, Melbourne, 15 
May 2009). 
73  Sean Fewster, ‘SA Chief Justice Chris Kourakis Says Retiring Judges Will Not Be Replaced Due 
to Funding Cuts’, The Advertiser (25 June 2013); Nicola Berkovic, ‘Fewer Judges Equals More 
Delays, says Wayne Martin’, The Australian (19 May 2014). See also Sean Parnell, ‘Chief Justice 
Takes on Abbott Over Cuts’, The Australian (21 February 2014). 
74  Gerard Brennan, ‘The State of the Judicature’ (1998) 72 Australian Law Journal 33, 35. 
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n=34) and lower courts (Magistrates/Local, n=48) were more likely to see workload as 
a challenge (82 per cent and 87 per cent respectively agreed or strongly agreed with 
this proposition), compared to the intermediate courts (District/County/Federal Circuit, 
n=48) (60 per cent). 
Only a small number of comments reflected the position that judges’ workloads were 
not a challenge. For instance, one respondent commented: 
Judges work hard, but so they should - it is an important public office, and a privilege. The 
workload is manageable, and our court is well resourced. However, it is another reason why 
judges shouldn’t work on too late in life - it is demanding. (Female; 0-4 years; Federal; 
Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Another indicated that they thought the current processes for distributing workload, at 
the least, were fair:  
Those judges who are responsible for overseeing listing of matters make a conscious effort to 
be fair in the spread of matters amongst the judges. (Female; 15-19 years’ service; Qld; 
Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Some comments in relation to workload revealed high levels of stress and concerns 
over judicial health: 
It is recognized across the board that caseloads are high, (and higher than in the past), there is a 
pressure to keep taking more work to keep up with demand, and a resultant feeling the work is 
unremitting and judges have no control over their lives. (Female; 10-14 years’ service; Vic; 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Cut backs on judicial appointments affecting mental health and quality of life for judicial 
officers. (Female; 15-19 years’ service; NSW; Magistrates/Local). 
Some respondents expressed concern with workload, and presumably stress, of 
working in areas beyond their expertise: 
I would like to see the option of judges being able to work only in the areas in which they have 
had experience. e.g., crime only. (Female; 10-14 years’ service; Qld; District/County/Federal 
Circuit). 
Other respondents who were concerned about workload indicated the variety of factors 
that had contributed to it, including lack of adequate resources, the introduction of new 
performance measures and the changing nature of legal practice: 
Courts expect too much from judges. Bodies such as the Productivity Commission which 
produce statistics purporting to assess judicial “productivity” as if judges were making widgets 
rather than engaging in a difficult process of evaluating a number of different factual and legal 
propositions, nevertheless agitate heads of jurisdiction (who should know better) to demand 
faster “turn around” from judges so their court “looks” better. They impose immense stress in 
what is an already stressful environment. (Female; 10-14 years’ service; NSW; 
Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Presently and hitherto the solution to increasing workloads appears to have been to exact greater 
efficiency from judicial officers but “transacting” more matters in a shorter time per matter. 
This damages the integrity of the proper and fair consideration of each case on an individual 
basis and inherently the quality of justice administered. (Male; 5-9 years’ service; Vic; 
Magistrates/Local). 
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There is an ever increasing quantity of work combined with increasing complexity and 
frequently changing legislation with ever reducing support. (Male; 25 + years’ service; WA; 
Magistrates/Local). 
As mediation and other alternative dispute resolution continue to impact, the residue of hearings 
are more complex and need more reflection and writing time. (Male; 10-14 years’ service; 
Federal; Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Others expressed their understanding that workloads differed depending on a variety of 
factors, particularly experience, level of court and type of work: 
I think this depends on the area in which you are working and the length of time on the bench. 
As a new judge, the load is undoubtedly greater as you develop systems to ensure you stay on 
top of reserve decisions. (Female; 0-4 years’ service; Qld; District/County/Federal Circuit). 
This is an enormous challenge. Magistrates have no control, or indeed input into how their 
courts function, unless based in a country location where there is some measure of 
control/influence. Over time volume has significantly increased, the jurisdiction of magistrates 
has increased significantly. Magistrates do not have their own staff, are now expected to do data 
entry which was the work of the Judicial Support Officer (Associate) without recognition of the 
impact on the role of the judicial officer, and justice. (Female; 10-14 years’ service; WA; 
Magistrates/Local). 
Respondents took an opportunity in their comments to elaborate on the exact nature of 
the staffing and support challenges facing their jurisdiction. Chief among these were 
inadequacy of IT support: 
We are very badly resourced. For e.g. this week I am in a court which has no audio visual link 
and so I have to swap courts to conduct the court case requiring that link. Also this week the 
prime exhibits in my trial are DVDs. I have just discovered the jury are in a room without the 
ability to watch them. (Female; 5-9 years’ service; NSW; District/County/Federal Circuit). 
This is generally good but as I sit in a regional court, it inevitably follows that we do not have 
the same level of technical support available to a Brisbane judge. … (Male; 20-24 years’ service; 
Qld; District/County/Federal Circuit). 
The staffing for the judges directly is adequate, but we should have better technological 
assistance (e.g. we are not provided with smart phones or with iPads). Court resources more 
generally are a problem. My court has 1 person providing free ADR services to the whole of 
the State, doing a job which is done by multiple people in other jurisdictions. It took much effort 
to get minor funding for creating and then extending e-search facilities and we still can’t get e-
filing. These are just examples. (Male; 10-14 years’ service; Qld; District/County/Federal 
Circuit). 
Another concern identified was the level of support for judges who are subject to online 
trolling or attack: 
There is no support for judges who are threatened, trolled, or the subject of sustained attack. 
(demographics not provided) 
Others expressed their views about lack of and reducing staff support, a comment that 
was made particularly often by respondents working in the lower courts: 
The move to get rid of tipstaves worries me. As a criminal trial judge regularly on circuit my 
tipstaves’ role is very important. (Female; 10-14 years’ service; Vic; District/County/Federal 
Circuit). 
 33 
Cuts to public sector employees mean the courts are dealing with more cases, more outcomes 
need to be processed, courts are sitting for longer periods of time and there are less court staff 
available to process the work generated by the court. There are simply some tasks such as 
entering offenders into good behaviour bonds, issuing warrants for remand prisoners by way of 
example which cannot, under any circumstance, be postponed to another day. (Female; 15-19 
years’ service; NSW; Magistrates/Local). 
Registry staff more than decimated under previous government, not rectified or likely to be. 
(Female; 15-19 years’ service; Qld; Supreme/Federal/Family). 
There is no support at all for magistrates. We type our own judgements, we do our own research 
and generally have the privilege of paying for the latter also. (Female; 15-19 years’ service; 
NSW; Magistrates/Local). 
Other concerns were that the judicial officers did not have sufficient autonomy over the 
hiring and supervision of support staff: 
The court staff is employed by the department rather than the court and there are too few of 
them. (Female; 15-19 years’ service; Qld; Supreme/Federal/Family) 
As with workload, many respondents identified their concerns with staffing and support 
as directly attributable to funding cuts and productivity expectations: 
Staffing is constantly being reduced in order to meet the ludicrous and arbitrary “productivity” 
percentage which has no place in the delivery of justice in a democracy. (Male; 5-9 years’ 
service; Federal; Supreme/Federal/Family). 
6 Judicial Remuneration and Access to Pensions 
Judicial remuneration and pension arrangements has been the cause of ongoing tensions 
between the judiciary and the executive, and adequacy of remuneration can cut to the 
heart of judicial independence.75 For example, there was a successful challenge to the 
federal attempt to charge state judges a surcharge on their pensions, 76  and an 
unsuccessful challenge by Federal Magistrates (now Federal Circuit judges) to their 
contributory superannuation scheme.77 At the federal level, there is a constitutional 
guarantee that remuneration will not be reduced during a judge’s tenure under s 72. But 
the Constitution is otherwise silent about the quantum of remuneration or how it is 
determined. Across Australia, remuneration is generally set by independent tribunals, 
such as the Commonwealth’s Remuneration Tribunal, subject to disallowance by the 
Parliament.78 In a broader sense, the sufficiency of remuneration may also adversely 
affect the administration of justice by its impact upon the attraction and retention of 
high quality candidates for appointment to the bench. 
In their 2007 survey of judicial officers, Mack and Roach Anleu reported high levels of 
satisfaction with the rate of salary and benefits (69.4 per cent and 76.3 per cent 
                                                        
75  George Winterton, Judicial Remuneration in Australia (Australian Institution of Judicial 
Administration, 1995) 19-31. 
76  Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185. 
77  Baker v Commonwealth [2012] FCAFC 121. 
78  See <www.remtribunal.gov.au/about-us> accessed 24 February 2016. See further, Brian Opeskin, 
‘The High Cost of Judges: Reconsidering Judicial Pensions and Retirement in an Ageing Population 
(2011) 39 Federal Law Review 33, 40-43. 
 34 
respectively).79 However, just under one-third of judges (30.9 per cent) agreed that 
‘considering all the factors associated with my work, my remuneration is low’. One 
third (33.6 per cent) were neutral and just over one third (35.6 per cent) disagreed with 
the statement.  
With the exception of many lower courts and Tasmania, which operate contribution-
based superannuation schemes, the general pension scheme that operates in Australia 
is a non-contributory, non-capped entitlement.80 Subject to certain conditions related to 
age and prior service, the judicial pension is generally set at 60 per cent of the current 
judicial salary. If a judge dies in office or retirement before his or her spouse, the spouse 
retains an entitlement to a percentage of the judicial pension.81 While judicial pensions 
are generally considered one of the most important attractions of judicial office, the 
current scheme is not without its critics. For instance, Opeskin has warned, at a time of 
population ageing, the resulting increase in the government’s unfunded liability for the 
current judicial pension system poses a significant strain on resources and ultimately 
the system itself.82 
The survey asked respondents whether they thought ‘judicial remuneration and 
pensions’ were challenges in their jurisdiction. There was little disagreement with this 
proposition (only 19 per cent of respondents disagreeing or strongly disagreeing), with 
49 per cent of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing and 32 per cent neutral 
(Figure 5).  
Only one demographic factor was correlated with different responses, namely the level 
of court. Judicial officers working in the lower courts (Magistrates, Local n=48) were 
significantly more likely to see judicial remuneration and pensions as a challenge (71 
per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this proposition). In contrast, 
respondents from the intermediate courts (District, County, Federal Circuit, n=48) 
appeared less concerned (42 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this 
proposition; and superior courts (the Supreme, Federal and Family Courts, n=34) even 
less (26 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this proposition). This 
reflects the current arrangements in which magistrates are not given the same pension 
entitlements as other judicial officers, and was evident again in the commentary 
provided by respondents. 
A number of judges expressed their satisfaction with the current levels of remuneration, 
and the pension scheme featured prominently in this consideration, for instance: 
Very good public sector salary and regular review. (Male; 5-9 years’ service; NSW; 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
                                                        
79  Mack and Roach Anleu, ‘The National Survey of Australian Judges’, above n 6, 18; see also 
Opeskin, ‘The High Cost of Judges’, above n 78, 43-46. 
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81  Ibid, 46-47. 
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Judges focus too much on their remuneration and benefits and not enough on their 
responsibilities. When one of the world’s most generous pensions is taken into account, we are 
very well looked after. (Male; 5-9 years’ service; Federal; Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Others, however, were very concerned about the current remuneration and pension 
arrangements, with a particular eye to the need to attract appropriate candidates: 
It’s absurd that Judges do not even receive CPI increases over a 2-year period. (Male; 5-9 years’ 
service; WA; District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Pension rules are complex and arbitrary. (Female; 0-4 years’ service; Vic; 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Our remuneration is linked to decisions of the federal tribunal. Those determinations of late 
have made judicial remuneration less attractive to those leading practitioners who would make 
the best appointees. Further, our “entitlements”, including travel allowances are not linked to 
the federal determinations or to anything, have not been reviewed in more than a decade, are 
very low and there is no plan for review. (Male; 10-14 years’ service; Qld; 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
One respondent expressed their concern over remuneration as explicitly tied to their 
workload:  
[G]enerally happy remuneration is tied to federal increases, but a general sense the increase in 
workload and complexity means remuneration should be higher. (Female; 10-14 years’ service; 
Vic; District/County; Federal Circuit) 
There were also other concerns expressed because of disparity of remuneration and 
pensions across jurisdictions within the federation: 
There is dissatisfaction with those Victorian provisions which affect us adversely, comparative 
to interstate counterparts: minimum retirement age is 65, not 60, and pension is suspended if a 
practicing certificate is taken out. … (Female; 10-14 years’ service; Vic; District/County; 
Federal Circuit). 
Div. 293 tax83 only applies to NT SC judges - Fed Ct judges & SCt judges from other States are 
exempt. (Male; 0-4 years’ service; NT; Supreme; Federal/Family). 
There was some dissatisfaction about the current processes for setting remuneration, 
and interestingly this spanned jurisdictions that used government and tribunal 
mechanisms. For instance: 
This process should be independent of government and not determined by political expediency. 
There is no effective mechanism to support, advance or advocate for proper conditions and 
remuneration for Victorian Judicial Officers, particularly Magistrates. (Female; 15-19 years’ 
service; Vic; Magistrates/Local). 
Too much time is taken up in the federal sphere making submissions to the Remuneration 
Tribunal. (Female; 15-19 years’ service; Federal; Supreme/Federal/Family). 
There was some specific concern around the move in some jurisdictions to a 
contributory superannuation scheme in lieu of the traditional pension entitlement:  
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The position of magistrates having no access to either a pension or at least support for medical 
retirement is critical. (Male; 5-9 years’ service; NSW; Magistrates/Local). 
In contrast, another respondent was in favour of a broader move to the contributory 
model: 
In my view, it would be better to pay people a larger salary from which they make savings into 
super funds like everyone else in the community. The salary package would also be far more 
transparent. (Male; 20-24 years’ service; NSW; Magistrates/Local). 
Some suggestions for reform were made to improve the current pension scheme, 
particularly in light of concerns around the ageing of judicial retirees: 
Given longevity of judges, pension should in fairness not commence until 15 years of service 
or attaining 65 or more. (Male; 10-14 years’ service; Federal; Supreme/Federal/Family). 
7 Mandatory Retirement and Capacity Testing 
It is only a short distance from the topic of remuneration and pensions to that of judicial 
retirement. Indeed, financial considerations are made particularly acute by the fact that, 
in all Australian jurisdictions, judicial officers are subject to a mandatory retirement 
age. This is constitutionally entrenched for members of the federal judiciary following 
the 1977 amendment by referendum of s 72 of the Australian Constitution.84  The 
introduction of mandatory retirement from judicial office at the federal level followed 
the earlier imposition of age limits upon the length of judicial service in the Supreme 
Courts of all states – with New South Wales being the first to do so in 1918.85 
At the federal level, the mandatory judicial retirement age is set at 70 years, but s 72 
expressly empowers the Parliament to prescribe a lower maximum age for federal 
judicial officers other than High Court judges. Seventy years is also the age limit for 
state and territory judicial officers with just a few exceptions. The mandatory retirement 
age in New South Wales and Tasmania for all judicial officers is set two years higher 
at age 72,86 and the mandatory retirement age for Magistrates in Western Australia and 
the ACT is 65 years. 87  The appropriateness of the current age limits has been 
questioned, particularly in light of medical advancements that have greatly increased 
life expectancy, and some have argued that the age of 70 years is too low. At the federal 
level, any upward change to that limit would require a constitutional referendum. 
Arguments have been made in favour of, and against, the use of judicial age limits. In 
1976 a report of the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs 
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Victoria are now spent and all presently serving judicial officers in that State must retire at 70 years. 
87 WA: Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) sch 1 cl 11(1)(a); ACT: Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) 
s 7D. 
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examined the judicial retirement age. It argued that mandatory judicial retirement 
would maintain vigorous and dynamic courts, provide greater opportunity for younger, 
able legal practitioners to serve on the bench, and reduce the likelihood that judges who 
lack capacity would continue in office. It also saw mandatory retirement as consistent 
with a growing acceptance of a mandatory retirement age across the world. 88 To these 
have been added the social benefits that can be gained from retired judges applying 
their experience in other roles, such as royal commissioners.89 However, some have 
argued that mandatory retirement ages are ‘an arbitrary, discriminatory and outdated 
feature of Australian constitutional law’,90 that results in the premature loss of judicial 
talent.91 
More recent reviews, while accepting the limitations and problems associated with 
mandatory age limits, have considered them nonetheless necessary. In 2012 the United 
Kingdom’s House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, acknowledged that 
‘age is undoubtedly a blunt tool by which to assess whether someone is no longer fully 
capable of performing their job’ but was resigned to its use because ‘the principle of 
judicial independence necessarily makes it very difficult to force a judge to retire on 
the grounds of declining capacity to act’.92 
Judicial officers were asked to ‘indicate whether or not you think there should be a 
mandatory retirement age for judicial officers’. Those who answered ‘Yes’ were then 
asked to ‘indicate at what age retirement from the judiciary should be mandated’. Of 
the 135 respondents, only 9 per cent (n=12) gave ‘No’ as their answer, reflecting 
overwhelming support amongst the judiciary for the current system of age limits 
determining judicial service in all Australian jurisdictions.  
There were 120 responses to the follow up question asking for an indication of the age 
at which retirement should be mandated (Figure 6). Excluding the ages of 60, 65, 78 
and 80, which each had a very small number of adherents, there were three ages that 
received substantial support for mandatory retirement. These were 70 years (42 per 
cent), 72 years (17 per cent) and 75 years (25 per cent). A small number of respondents 
                                                        
88 Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Report 
on Retiring Age for Commonwealth Judges (1976) 11. See also Brian Opeskin, ‘Models of Judicial 
Tenure’ (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 627, 639-40. Opeskin explains that ‘the issue 
became a live one from the mid-1970s as the Australian parliament began to create new federal 
courts, invest them with jurisdiction and appoint judges to hear and determine the new matters’ (at 
639). 
89 Alysia Blackham, ‘Judges and Retirement Ages’ (2016) 39 Melbourne University Law Review 738, 
771.  
90 Ibid 784. See also Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Access All Ages—Older Workers 
and Commonwealth Laws, Report No 120 (2013) 100; Opeskin, ‘Models of Judicial Tenure’, above 
n 88, 635. 
91 See Blackham, above n 89, 772-73; Louis Blom-Cooper, ‘The Age of Judicial Responsibility: The 
Retirement and Resignation of Appellate Court Judges’ in Shimon Shetreet and Christopher Forsyth 
(eds), The Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 339, 340-41. 
92 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Parliament of the United Kingdom, Judicial 
Appointments (2012) 59 [191]. 
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(7 per cent indicated age ranges, such as 70–72 or 70–75 years, which are indicated in 
Figure 6 as ‘Other Range’. 
Figure 6: Age of Mandatory Retirement 
 
 
As New South Wales and Tasmania currently have an age limit of 72 years, one might 
have expected this to be apparent in a decomposition by jurisdiction. Interestingly, of 
the 32 respondents from New South Wales, only 8 favoured the existing age limit, while 
9 favoured 70 years and 13 favoured 75 years. Only three judicial officers from 
Tasmania responded to this question, two favouring that state’s existing retirement age 
limit of 72 years and one preferring 75 years. 
Few respondents commented on this question explaining their view of the appropriate 
age limit, but a sample includes the following: 
I think 70 works well. The legal profession is cumulative in terms of knowledge and experience 
and I think many people do their best work in their 50s and 60s. (Female, 0-4 years’ service, 
Federal, Supreme/Federal/Family) 
I believe 70 is about right. I would make an exception for the High Court of 75. (Female, 15-19 
years’ service, Federal, Supreme/Federal/Family) 
Around 70 is acceptable as long as service for at least 10 years is also a criterion eg to receive 
a full pension. (Female, 10-14 years’ service, NSW, Supreme/Federal/Family) 
80 but subject to earlier declaration of incapacity (Male, 0–4 years’ service, NSW, 
Supreme/Federal/Family) 
One comment addressed the question of retirement age by reference to different types 
of appointment, pointing out the need for two age limits upon judicial service, namely 
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72 years for permanent judicial officers and 75 years for acting appointments.93 This 
comment highlighted an issue that was the subject of a separate survey question. 
Respondents were asked to indicate ‘the extent to which you agree that post-retirement 
age limits on the use of acting judicial officers are appropriate’ (Figure 5). The response 
was largely positive and indicates that a majority either agreed or strongly agreed with 
existing arrangements (64 per cent), or were neutral (18 per cent). Some 19 per cent 
had concerns about the appropriateness of the post-retirement age limits.  
The main thrust of the comments on the question of age limits for acting judges focused 
on capacity, for instance: 
There are some judges who need to retire early while others are forced to retire when 
they are still perfectly capable. A good experienced competent judge is a really valuable 
asset and as long as appropriate capacity checks are in place I don't see the need for an 
age limit. People are far more healthy and vigorous than in the past so expecting a person 
to be less able at a particular age is not necessarily a reliable indicator. In the community 
generally people are expected to work longer, the age pension is expected to be lifted to 
70 years, which although not totally on all fours with my argument, there is no reason 
why people's increased capacity to work to a later stage should not be reflected among 
judges. (Female, 10-14 years’ service, Vic, District/County/Federal Circuit)  
One respondent noted that capacity problems could be easier to manage in the context 
of an acting appointment: 
As the positions are acting only, there can be more discretion and an easier termination 
if a person is no longer acute enough to fill the role. (Female, 15-19 years’ service, Qld, 
District/County/Federal Circuit)  
Judicial officers were also asked to ‘indicate the extent to which you agree it would be 
appropriate for judicial officers to be asked to undergo capacity checks at the request 
of a Head of Jurisdiction or a relevant body constituted by judges’ (Figure 5). Of the 
135 respondents, just 12 per cent expressed any form of disagreement, while 11 per 
cent were neutral on the question. Those in agreement constituted 77 per cent of 
respondents with 56 per cent selecting ‘agree’ and 21 per cent selecting ‘strongly 
agree’.  
Comments in favour indicated that, although rare, the problem of judicial officers 
serving while at less than full capacity was not a theoretical one and a better response 
system was required. The more pointed comments included the following: 
This is a very vexed issue and would require extraordinary sensitivity and safeguards, 
but the reality is that every head of jurisdiction would say that most of their “pastoral” 
time with members of their court is taken up with a small number and the rest just get on 
with the job. I think that there is much more understanding of depression and other 
debilitating health issues and certainly my experience is that if the individual asks for 
help it will be given generously and without judgment. The problem is the judicial officer 
who has problems (which are reflected adversely in her work) and they are not prepared 
to seek help. It is then that I think that the head of jurisdiction (perhaps after consulting 
                                                        
93  Female, 25+ years’ service, NSW, District/County/Federal Circuit. 
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senior colleagues) should have the capacity to compel such tests. (Male, 20-24 years’ 
service, Qld, District/County/Federal Circuit)  
Although comparatively rare, senile judges present real problems. The existence of a 
formalised structure would make it easier to deal with. (Male, 5-9 years’ service, Federal, 
Supreme/Federal/Family)  
Several responses emphasized the importance that any such power of request be 
accompanied by ‘safeguards’ (Male, 10-14 years’ service, Qld, Magistrates/Local) or 
‘a proper and fair procedure’ (Female, 10-14 years’ service, Vic, 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
C. Discussion 
In the work cycle of the judge, 50 per cent or more respondents to the survey identified 
education of judicial officers, workload, and staffing and support services as current 
challenges in their jurisdiction. The issue of judicial remuneration and pensions was 
very near to inclusion in this list, with 49 per cent of respondents agreeing or strongly 
agreeing that it was a current challenge. 
It might have been expected that workload and staffing and support services would be 
identified as such. These issues, implicating as they do the resourcing of the judicial 
arm, have been identified in other research as matters of concern for judicial officers.94 
Despite the persistence of these results, there is no indication that these concerns are 
being systematically addressed. What our survey responses indicate is that, from the 
judicial perspective, the failures of support often manifest themselves in prosaic ways 
similar to those shared in other government departments and business, for instance, lack 
of adequate IT support, or insufficient direct control over support staff. The survey also 
provides a revealing inside perspective on the stress that workload and under-
resourcing causes. This ranged from the additional stress that Productivity Commission 
reporting has caused for the judiciary, the stresses and mental health issues flowing 
from unmanageable workloads, to the inadequate resourcing of support services to 
judges who might suffer harassment. The significance of jurisdiction and court level 
also provided some guidance in relation to this issue. The challenge of workloads in the 
superior and lower courts suggests that these areas warrant particular attention. This 
likely reflects the ‘churn’ factor of a large volume of smaller matters in the lower courts; 
and in the superior courts the burden of lengthy judgment writing is perhaps the factor 
at work. 
The significant concern among respondents that education of judicial officers remains 
a challenge for the judiciary is, on the one hand, somewhat surprising given the recent 
advancements in the provision of continuing education to judicial officers. On the other 
hand, it reflects a growing consensus around the importance of judicial education, and 
a more critical perspective on the adequacy of the efforts to achieve it to date. The 
comments reveal criticisms of the availability of education programs, the resources that 
                                                        
94 Mack, Wallace and Roach Anleu, above n 70, 30-1. See also Wallace, Roach Anleu and Mack, 
above n 71, 452-3. 
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support them, and their quality. The variability of education between the different 
jurisdictions was also a matter for comment that might suggest further investigation of 
ways to support education opportunities across jurisdictions is warranted. 
The divided response to whether the use temporary judicial officers is a challenge 
reflects an ongoing division amongst the judiciary about such appointments, with some 
openly expressly concern, and others happily accepting temporary appointment after 
retirement (often adding to the disquiet of others!). The judges are actively attempting 
to address this division and unresolved tension, for instance, in the Judicial Conference 
of Australia commissioning a report into the practice.95 It demonstrates the complex 
nature of such appointments, which deliver significant benefits for the efficient 
administration of justice while simultaneously raising real concerns about the 
independence of the judiciary. 
The high proportion of neutral responses to the question of whether part-time 
appointments represent a challenge perhaps reflect the underdeveloped use of part-time 
judges even in those jurisdictions that permit them, and the prohibition on part-time 
appointments at the higher levels, so that judicial officers have not had sufficient 
experience of these appointments to have formed a view. The otherwise mixed 
responses are likely to reflect the fact that, in the judicial sphere, it is not yet clear 
whether the arguments in favour of part-time and flexible working arrangements 
outweigh the perceived costs. The correlation of gender with greater concern regarding 
part-time appointments is likely explained by the largely gendered foundation that 
underpins the need for greater workplace flexibility.96 
This question of whether sufficient ethical support is being provided is one in which 
the individual judicial perspective is particularly pertinent. The responses reveal that it 
is considered a challenge, at least for a significant percentage of judges (35 per cent). 
The introduction of new ethical support systems, including consideration of more 
formalised support, should not require the agreement of a majority of judges before its 
introduction, and the data provide an important intervention in this area to prompt 
further consideration of how better to formalise and institutionalise reform. The 
suggestions of the judges themselves as to how this might be achieve provide 
jurisdictions with a solid starting point. 
The responses to the question of judicial retirement ages represented a significant 
intervention in this issue. While there was no clear consensus about the most 
appropriate age for retirement, the responses support the proposition that there is little 
disquiet amongst the judiciary about the prospect of capacity testing for older judicial 
officers. This is a highly significant finding, challenging assumptions often made by 
those outside the judiciary about the extent to which certain proposals for judicial 
                                                        
95  Appleby, Le Mire, Lynch and Opeskin, above n 52. 
96  See, for example, the Commonwealth Workplace Gender Equality Agency, and their strategies on 
workplace flexibility: https://www.wgea.gov.au/lead/strategic-approach-flexibility  
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accountability will be tolerated as compatible with the principle of judicial 
independence. 
Finally, in relation to remuneration, it is unsurprising that a number of judges found 
judicial remuneration a challenge. In this dimension, judges are perhaps self-interested 
but their concerns should not be so simply dismissed. If governments take seriously the 
stated objective of attracting the most qualified individuals to the job (although this 
represents only one of many objectives underpinning judicial remuneration), a number 
of comments reveal that the current levels of remuneration may not be achieving this. 
 
VI. COMPLAINTS, DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 
A. Context 
The Australian judiciary is, overall, dedicated, competent and acts with high levels of 
integrity. Nevertheless there are occasions when judicial officers fail to meet the 
standards expected of them, either as a consequence of misconduct or incapacity. In 
those instances, their conduct warrants a measured, transparent and appropriate 
response. Regulation of judicial conduct has proved to be quite sensitive, with the major 
concern being crafting a system that provides accountability without derogating from 
judicial independence. The first legislative reform occurred in 1986 in New South 
Wales,97 and was followed by a long hiatus before a number of jurisdictions introduced 
reforms this century.98  
As a result, the regulation in this area is in a period of transition. Traditionally, concerns 
about judicial conduct are managed in six key ways. The first is by selecting judicial 
officers of appropriate character, who are less likely to cause difficulties during their 
tenure. The second is through the appeal process. While this process primarily considers 
matters of professional judgment, it can also raise conduct issues.99 For example, a 
misogynistic comment may be both misdirection to a jury leading to an appealable error 
and a conduct issue.100 The third is through the transparency of open court procedures, 
which expose a judge to public scrutiny. The fourth is through the adoption and 
promulgation of standards of judicial conduct. Fifth, there is an informal role for fellow 
judges, in particular the heads of jurisdiction, in counselling offending judges and 
                                                        
97  Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW). 
98  Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA); Judicial Complaints Act 2012 (Cth); Judicial Conduct 
Commissioner Act 2015 (SA); Judicial Commission of Victoria Act 2016 (Vic). 
99  Appleby and Le Mire, above n 15, 7-8. 
100  Transcript of Proceedings, R v Johns (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Bollen J, 26 
August 1992) 12–13, quoted in Question of Law (No 1 of 1993) [1993] SASC 3896; (1993) 59 
SASR 214, 219 (King CJ), 232–3 (Perry J), 237 (Duggan J). The Court of Criminal Appeal found 
that the direction ‘was apt to convey the impression that consent might be induced by 
force’: Question of Law (No 1 of 1993) [1993] SASC 3896; (1993) 59 SASR 214, 234 (Perry J), 
238 (Duggan J). King CJ dissented: at 222.  
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assisting them in remedying inappropriate behaviour. Finally, there is the ‘nuclear 
option’ of removal of a judge from office in cases of serious misconduct or incapacity.  
Naturally the removal option can, and should, be rarely employed, and in almost all 
Australian jurisdictions it requires the involvement of the parliament. For example, the 
Australian Constitution provides that federal judges ‘shall not be removed except by 
the Governor-General in Council, on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in 
the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or 
incapacity’.101  
In several of the jurisdictions that have introduced judicial complaints and disciplinary 
reforms, little more has been achieved than the codification of the traditional 
approach.102 Typically they provide some, mostly administrative power, to the Heads 
of Jurisdiction to provide a limited response to misconduct. For instance, under the 
federal system, Commonwealth legislation provides: 
The jurisdictional head may take any measures that the jurisdictional head believes are 
reasonably necessary to maintain public confidence in the court (including, but not limited to, 
temporarily restricting another judicial officer to non-sitting duties).103 
This suggests the head of jurisdiction has the power to speak to the judge involved, and, 
where necessary, use their administrative powers to try to resolve the issue. In New 
South Wales, the Judicial Commission has the power to refer complaints to heads of 
jurisdiction if ‘it does not justify the attention of the Conduct Division’,104 but the heads 
of jurisdiction have even more limited power than is provided by the federal 
legislation. 105  South Australia and Western Australia also rely on the head of 
jurisdiction to manage complaints short of those, which, if established, could warrant 
removal.106 An additional procedure in the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), allows 
the Attorney General to suspend magistrates where they have demonstrated a physical 
or mental incapacity or engaged in misconduct.107 
The approaches that tend towards codification of the traditional system can be 
contrasted with more comprehensive formal responses, such as those in place in 
England and Wales.108 The most recent effort in Victoria appears to move towards this 
by incorporating lay voices in the disciplinary system, creating a system for compulsory 
medical testing in situations where there are concerns about capacity, and providing 
support for heads of jurisdiction faced with misconduct problems.109 
                                                        
101  Constitution s 72(ii). 
102  For example, Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW). 
103  Judicial Complaints Act 2012 (Cth) sch 1 ss 5, 18; see also at sch 1 s 28.  
104  Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) s 21(2). 
105  Judicial Officers Act 1986 (NSW) s 21(2) and (3). 
106  Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015 (SA) s 18; Department of the Attorney General (WA), 
Protocol for Complaints against Judicial Officers in Western Australian Courts (August 2007). 
107  Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), Schedule 1, cl 15. 
108  See further Richard Devlin and Adam Dodek (eds), Regulating Judges: Beyond Independence and 
Accountability (Edward Elgar 2016). 
109  The Judicial Commission of Victoria Act 2016 commenced operation on 1 July 2017.. 
 44 
B. Survey Data 
This patchwork of regulation across Australia provided the backdrop for a series of six 
survey questions about complaints, discipline and removal. The distribution of 
responses is illustrated in Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Complaints, Discipline and Removal 
 
 
1 Management and Investigation of Complaints 
The first question asked judicial officers to indicate generally the extent to which they 
agreed ‘management and investigation of complaints’ was a challenge in their 
jurisdiction (Figure 7). The most frequent response was neutral (49 per cent) while 35 
per cent agreed or strongly agreed that that the complaints processes constituted a 
challenge and 17 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
The respondents’ comments reflected the transition in arrangements in several 
jurisdictions. Some explained that Victorian judicial officers were waiting to see how 
the new institutional approaches would work out. A number of comments from New 
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South Wales expressed satisfaction with the judicial commission model operating 
there: 
NSW system is OK. Except that it could be more efficient. (Demographic data omitted). 
I am quite satisfied with the role of the Judicial Commission in NSW and believe there 
should be a constitutionally acceptable complaints process available to the public for 
every court. Judicial office should not confer immunity from investigation of complaints 
if undertaken in an acceptable way. (Female, 0-4 years’ service, Federal, 
District/County/Federal Circuit) 
The Judicial Commission is set up to handle such challenges and does so admirably 
(Male, 10-14 years’ service, Magistrates/Local, NSW) 
In other jurisdictions, there was a high level of satisfaction expressed with the 
traditional system, with a wariness of judicial commissions: 
The internal process is thorough and, I think, fair. I support the theory of a Judicial 
Commission, but beware (a) the bureaucracy and (b) effectiveness being impaired by 
dealing with the mad and sad. (Male, 5-9 years’ service, Federal, 
Supreme/Federal/Family).  
Others were more critical of the traditional system: 
In 21 years I have had very little reason to complain so I am not qualified to comment. 
As far as complaints about judicial behaviour in court (and of course the major problem 
of delay in giving judgment) my opinion is that the in-house method is out of date. That 
is not in any way to reflect on any head of jurisdiction in my time, but the reality is the 
lawyer writing to the Chief Judge about a judgment that is a year old, must feel at least 
a tiny bit of concern that his or her complaint may affect the ultimate outcome. The NSW 
Judicial Commission system seems to work well so that is what I favour. (Male, 20-24 
years’ service, District/County/Federal Circuit). 
The existing system is entirely unsatisfactory. There is no established process and no 
independent oversight of the head of jurisdiction’s handling of a complaint, should there 
be a difference of opinion between the magistrate and head of jurisdiction. Magistrates 
have been moved from one location to another, involving very significant disruption to 
family life, with no avenue for review, where there has been a disagreement with head 
of jurisdiction. In WA relocation can be up to 3000 kms having a significant impact on 
employment of a partner and schooling for children, etc. Fear of being directed to move 
to a country or other location which would disrupt the magistrate's family life operates 
to constrain magistrates from raising issues regarding the operation of the court. (Female, 
10–14 years’ service, Magistrates/Local, WA). 
2 Discipline and Removal Procedures 
The next question focused on the follow up to complaints, or other instances of 
misconduct or incapacity. Judicial officers were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they agreed that ‘adequacy of disciplining and removal procedures’ were a challenge 
in their jurisdiction (Figure 7). While 44 per cent of respondents were neutral, 34 per 
cent agreed or strongly agreed and 22 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
The data indicate that only gender was correlated with different responses. Female 
respondents were more likely to indicate that disciplinary and removal procedures were 
challenges: 37 per cent of female respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this 
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statement, in contrast to 24 per cent of male respondents. Correspondingly, 29 per cent 
of male respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed in comparison to 11 per cent of 
female respondents. 
Several comments reflected dissatisfaction with the existing arrangements, with typical 
comments pointing out the difficulties associated with managing poor performance and 
proceeding to removal. 
There needs to be a moderate reassessment of how to manage or remove judicial officers 
who are clearly bad appointments. (Female, 10–14 years’ service, Qld, 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Peer group pressure is a strong disincentive to misbehaviour but a bad appointee can stay 
for a long time and have a negative effect on other judges and the public. (Female, 15–
19 years’ service, Qld, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Some process is needed to ensure judges keep up to date with their work. (Male, 5–9 
years’ service, Federal, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Others put forward options for reform: 
It is very hard (and appropriately so) to remove judicial officers. In my view, 
appointments should be made independently through a Judicial Appointments 
Commission as in the UK. Perhaps disciplinary procedures and removals should also be 
conducted the same way. So, for example, the NSW Judicial Commission might be given 
the power to remove rather than merely to recommend removal by Parliament. (Male, 
20–24 years’ service, NSW, Magistrates/Local). 
Judicial independence is required. Removal only after the 5 most senior judges of the 
court vote by majority to remove the investigated Judge and then such removal approved 
by a majority vote of both houses of Parliament. (Male, 5–9 years’ service, WA, 
District/County/Federal Circuit). 
But not everyone was convinced that enhanced discipline and removal processes were 
the answer: 
It is a mistake to think that there is a way of “disciplining” a Judge other than removal 
in accordance with the traditional parliamentary process. Anything else fundamentally 
undermines judicial independence, which is by definition individual and fundamental. 
(Male, 0–4 years’ service, Qld, Supreme/Federal/Family). 
3 Complaints Handling 
The next question asked respondents to focus specifically on the ‘extent to which you 
agree that the current mechanisms for handling complaints about judicial conduct are 
sufficient in your jurisdiction’ (Figure 7). Some 47 per cent indicated their agreement; 
24 per cent were neutral, and 28 per cent either disagreed or strongly disagreed that 
current practices were sufficient. No demographic variables were correlated with the 
different responses. 
There were fewer comments in response to this question. One respondent provided a 
strong critique of the uncertainty associated with the traditional approach. 
There are no formal mechanisms currently, and informal mechanisms are inadequate, 
and not transparent. There are not even customs and conventions, which can set a norm. 
If an individual HoJ [head of jurisdiction] wanted to ignore past practice, or to introduce 
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changes, they are free to do so. There is no enforceable mechanism to compel a judge to 
engage with a complaint process, if they choose not to or do not accept or respect the 
informal authority of the HoJ. There is no guarantee of consistency of practice. There is 
nothing, which can give a member of the public who complains any sense a fair and 
transparent process for dealing with complaints. That is ironical, given the role of the 
courts and judges as impartial, transparent and accountable arbiters of disputes. (Female, 
10–14 years’ service, Vic, District/County/Federal Circuit). 
4 Best Practice Removal Procedures 
The next question drew on principles contained in the Commonwealth Latimer House 
Principles to seek views on the fairness of those same removal mechanisms. 110 
Principle VII(b) relevantly states: 
In addition to providing proper procedures for the removal of judicial officers on grounds of 
incapacity or misbehaviour that are required to support the principle of independence of the 
judiciary, any disciplinary procedures should be fairly and objectively administered. 
Disciplinary proceedings which might lead to the removal of a judicial officer should include 
appropriate safeguards to ensure fairness.  
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree that ‘the current 
arrangements for removing judicial officers in their jurisdiction satisfy the Bingham 
Report’s invocation of this principle as “best practice”’ (Figure 7). This was the first of 
the questions relevant to complaints, discipline and removal where there was a majority 
view. A majority of respondents (56 per cent) indicated that they agreed or strongly 
agreed that their jurisdiction was compliant with the Bingham Report’s best practice; 
25 per cent were neutral and 19 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed. 
5 Judicial Tenure 
The next question asked respondents to reflect on the topic at a more general level by 
indicating whether they agreed that ‘judicial tenure’ was a challenge in their jurisdiction 
(Figure 7). This question allowed respondents to consider judicial tenure broadly, and 
also provided the opportunity to use the comments facility to reveal ways in which they 
understood the topic beyond the understandings that may be assumed by outsiders.  
In sum, judicial opinions were mixed, although there was some consensus against this 
proposition. Of the 142 respondents, 28 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that this is a 
challenge, 32 per cent indicated neutrality and 39 per cent either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed. 
Only one demographic factor—level of court—was correlated with different responses. 
Respondents from superior courts (the Supreme, Federal and Family Courts) were more 
likely not to see judicial tenure as a challenge (59 per cent of respondents) when 
compared with those respondents appointed to either the lower courts (Magistrates, 
Local, 27 per cent) or the intermediate courts (District, County, Federal Circuit, 40 per 
cent). The lower courts were most strongly concerned with judicial tenure, with 46 per 
                                                        
110  These principles are intended to set out the ‘an effective framework for the implementation by 
governments, parliaments and judiciaries of the Commonwealth’s fundamental values’. 
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cent indicating they believed this to be a challenge (compared with 25 per cent in the 
intermediate courts and 12 per cent in the superior courts). 
The comments supported the current protections for judicial tenure: 
Courts and governments are often at odds, and judicial tenure is important to ensure judicial 
independence. (Female; 10-14 years’ service; Vic; District/County/Federal Circuit). 
One respondent expressed concern about the ability of governments to undermine 
tenure protections through removal mechanisms:  
Tenure is fundamental to independence, but also linked to issues such as pensions and 
disability/retirement entitlements. Tenure is a meaningless concept if a Judicial Officer can be 
removed for incapacity for example (illness) and there is no disability pension. (Female; 15-19 
years’ service; Vic; Magistrates/Local). 
One respondent expressed concern not with the security of tenure offered to her in her 
judicial capacity, but contrasted that with when she sat as a Tribunal member, where 
equivalent security of tenure is not provided: 
In the tribunal jurisdiction in which I also work this is a real issue, particularly tenure amongst 
senior members of that jurisdiction who are responsible for reviewing government decisions. 
(Female; 0-4 years’ service; Qld; District/County/Federal Circuit). 
6 Power of Removal 
The final question sought judicial views on vesting the power of removal in an 
independent disciplinary body, separate from both executive and legislature, or 
retaining the status quo, with the legislature retaining sole decision-making 
responsibility for determining the removal of judicial officers. The question again drew 
on the Bingham Report (Figure 7). 
Again the responses expose the diversity of opinion within the judiciary as to the most 
appropriate way to manage judicial removal. Some 44 per cent considered 
parliamentary approval as the only appropriate mechanism, with 18 per cent of those 
strongly agreeing with that proposition. By contrast, 19 per cent were neutral and 37 
per cent of respondents were open to an alternative model with a disciplinary body 
holding the power to remove.  
A number of those judicial officers who endorsed the process of parliamentary removal 
qualified their comments by indicating that an investigatory process should precede the 
parliamentary process. The following comments were typical: 
Some form of a tribunal or disciplinary council should exist to work with the executive 
and legislature. (Male, 10–14 years’ service, Qld, District/County/Federal Circuit). 
Removal of a judge is very serious and ought not be delegated. Certainly Judicial 
Commissions can and should make recommendations but the final decision ought to be 
by the legislature in full public view. (Male, 10–14 years’ service, Federal, 
Supreme/Federal/Family). 
Those who indicated openness to a disciplinary body removing a judicial officer cited 
concern with the way the parliamentary process works: 
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This enables politics and popularity to override reason and objectivity. (Female, 25+ 
years’ service, NSW, District/County/Federal Circuit) 
As the experience with professional bodies shows (and contrary to public perception), 
disciplinary bodies made up of peers are much more severe than the public. A judicial 
disciplinary body made up of senior judges would be a very good idea and would see 
many more judges disciplined. (Male, 5–9 years’ service, Federal, 
Supreme/Federal/Family). 
There was some diversity of interpretation of the question. Some judicial respondents 
disagreed with the question but indicated in their comments that they thought that a 
disciplinary tribunal or the like should investigate and make recommendations to 
parliament. Others agreed, indicating that they believed parliament should hold sole 
decision-making power over removal, but also made comments suggesting that they 
also thought the involvement of a tribunal to investigate and make recommendations 
was appropriate. 
C. Discussion 
None of the issues regarding complaints, discipline, tenure and removal was seen as a 
challenge by 50 per cent or more of respondents. While much recent reform has 
clustered around creating systems and processes for managing complaints, this was not 
a matter that aroused much concern in the respondents. Misconduct remains an area in 
which there were significant differences of opinion about how it should be managed. 
Perhaps this reveals that, as it is an area in which there has been considerable change, 
judges are waiting to see whether the new institutional approaches will address their 
concerns. Certainly the responses indicate that some of the hesitancies that 
accompanied the introduction of Australia’s first reforms in this area in New South 
Wales have lessened, with many respondents indicating their satisfaction with that 
model. 
The apparent correlation between gender and concern about disciplinary and removal 
processes is something of a puzzle. There are a number of possible reasons for the fact 
that female judicial officers are less satisfied with these processes, such as a sense that 
they are ineffective or unfair. However, no conclusion can be drawn from the data 
collected in this survey, and further qualitative study is needed. 
The revelation by one respondent of her concern about the tenure of tribunal members 
(rather than judicial officers) highlights the need for greater attention to be paid to the 
position of statutory officeholders who are given quasi-independence under their 
constituting legislation, and whether this is sufficient where they have obligations to 
review government decisions and actions. This would include tribunal members, but 
also officers such as the Ombudsman, human rights commissioners, and the Australian 
Information Commissioner.111 
                                                        
111  See further initial consideration of such questions in Gabrielle Appleby, ‘Horizontal 
Accountability: The Rights-Protective Promise and Fragility of Executive Integrity Institutions’ 
(2017) 23 Australian Journal of Human Rights 168. 
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The fact that respondents in the lower courts appeared more concerned about judicial 
tenure is consistent with the findings of Mack and Roach Anleau that magistrates do 
not in every respect enjoy the same protections as judges with regard to tenure.112 
Despite the evolution of magistrates, over the past few decades, from public servants 
to independent judicial officers, anomalies remain in some jurisdictions with regard to 
the consequences of abolishing lower courts, ages of mandatory retirement, protections 
against reduction in remuneration, and procedures and standards for suspension and 
removal. It is plausible that these were weighty considerations for respondents from 
lower courts when answering the questions relating to tenure. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article has tried to achieve two things. First, it has sought to interrupt the current 
scholarship and regulatory study of the judiciary by indicating the need to consider the 
wider judiciary’s views on these issues. The data have revealed the diverse array of 
concerns that are held by the Australian judiciary with respect to their profession and 
its operation as the third arm of government. It illuminates much of the current debate 
around the regulation of the judiciary. In some respects—for instance in relation to 
diversity and appointments, and in relation to the challenges of judicial workload and 
resourcing—it reinforces existing regulatory reform trajectories. But it may also be said 
to give added impetus to those efforts where political will is indifferent or enthusiasm 
has wavered. In other respects, the survey results challenge a relative lack of academic 
and regulatory interest. A good example of this is the concerns expressed by many 
respondents over the need for greater education and ethical support. This represents a 
clarion call for much more academic attention, and possibly even a more direct 
contribution to addressing this need of the judiciary. 
In more than a few areas, our empirical research reveals deep divisions within the 
judiciary. These often mirror divisions that have marked the scholarship and regulatory 
commentary on these topics. In other cases, with the strong judicial support for capacity 
checks being a good example, the results highlight the weakness of assumptions that 
appear frequently in academic and other commentary. 
Secondly, this article has reinforced the need for much deeper research, including 
empirical research conducted with the co-operation of, if not in partnership with, the 
Australian judiciary. With the exception of the landmark research of Mack and Roach 
Anleu, much of the public or professional understanding of judicial views on these 
issues have been through individual judicial contributions to public debates, or the 
confidential consultation that occurs between government and heads of jurisdiction. 
While efforts to bridge the wider divide between the judiciary and the academy are not 
uncommon in this country, they are typically focused on substantive areas of law, and 
rarely on the institution that judicial officers themselves constitute. 
                                                        
112 Mack and Roach Anleu, ‘The Security of Tenure of Australian Magistrates’, above n 10. 
 51 
The value of broader empirical work emerges from this study at a number of levels. 
Because judges are educated and intelligent individuals, with long-experience with 
different facets of the judicial system gained over the course of their careers, they have 
valuable contributions to make to debates about regulation and future directions of 
reform. They also bring a unique perspective from within the courts, and thus have an 
understanding of, for instance, the causes of stress within judicial ranks, or the internal 
institutional challenges of creating part-time appointments, or the level of ethical 
support they feel they need. Such inside perspectives might reveal the true complexity 
of the task of reform; or it might reveal that reform is more achievable than previously 
believed. Our survey has also demonstrated that while judicial perspectives are 
important, they should be considered one source of information, which needs to be 
supplemented, verified and contrasted with others. 
This article has demonstrated that this broader empirical research must be considered 
foundational in scholarly and regulatory debate. Only in this way can we aim to better 
understand and analyse competing arguments on the contemporary state of the 
judiciary, let alone its future. 
 
